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I. INTRODUCTION
Catastrophic occurrences, whether local or national, typically
prompt a variety of responses. Private responses usually follow
rapidly in the form of private donations, often through charitable
organizations. While our history has been one of essentially private
responses to catastrophic occurrences, there have also been
numerous legislative responses, state and federal, to a variety of
disasters. In some cases, a framework was established to respond to
continuing problems created by, for example, natural disasters, or
recurring problems such as compensating victims of crime, or to
provide means of compensation that are alternatives to tort
litigation. While there are various types of frameworks for
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compensating victims of catastrophic occurrences, there is certainly
no fixed formula to determine whether and in what form any
legislative response, congressional or state, should be.
The 9/11 attacks provided the basis for unprecedented
responses, both by the public at large and by Congress. Congress
approved the 9/11 Compensation Fund ("the Fund" or "the 9/11
Fund") less than eleven days after the attacks.' The goal of the
Fund was three fold. First, the Fund was conceived out of a
national sense of unity and compassion, ultimately leading to the
compensation of the victims of an unprecedented tragedy in our
nation's history.2  Second, it was designed to rescue the
beleaguered airline industry from financial ruin.3 Third, the Fund
provided an expedient means of compensating victims and
reducing their inevitable legal fees.4
In return, those seeking redress from the Fund were required
to forego traditional tort remedies against any potential tortfeasors
associated with the attacks; excluding, of course, any terrorists or
highjackers found to be associated with the attacks.' So, beyond
the three goals, the Fund had the effect of keeping already
crowded court dockets free from thousands of claims that would be
both highly contentious and lengthy.
On August 1, 2007, the forty-year-old Interstate 35W bridge
("I-35W bridge") over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis
collapsed, causing thirteen deaths and injuring numerous others. 6
1. Robert Ackerman, The September 1 1th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective
Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 135, 143
(2005).
2. Id. at 137.
3. Id. The airline industry faced billions of dollars in potential liability, not
to mention legal costs. The airlines were already facing a major financial crisis
with the three days of industry shutdown post-9/11 and imminent downturn in
business that was anticipated because of the attacks. Id. at 143. With estimated
losses in the coming year of $24 billion in addition to potential liability estimated
at $40 billion, the entire airline industry would have been in a catastrophic
situation. Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation,
53 DEPAUL L. REv. 627, 631 (2003). In addition, due to the risks of future terrorist
attacks, insurers threatened to withdraw coverage-without which the airlines
could not fly. Thus, a somewhat cynical, but not unfounded, view of the Fund is
that its main intention was to bail out the airline industry, and that the Fund was
added only to make it palatable to the American public: not the altruistic goal of
applying a bandage to the American soul.
4. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 137.
5. Id. at 145.
6. Matthew L. Wald & Monica Davey, States Advised to Check for a Bridge Design
Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at A17, available at 2008 WLNR 844774.
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The collapse of the bridge, one of the most heavily traveled in the
state, prompted public outrage; a tremendous outpouring of public
support for the victims, survivors, and their families; an immediate
search for explanations of what caused the collapse; and rapid
legislative responses in the form of short-term relief and
accelerated consideration by the legislature of a compensation
scheme to address the longer-term needs of survivors of the
collapse.
Private funds immediately began pouring into the Minnesota
Helps-Bridge Disaster Fund. As of July 29, 2008, this private fund
had collected contributions totaling $1.255 million and distributed
more than $1.1 million to victims of the collapse.' On October 25,
2007, the House held a hearing to hear from bridge-collapse
victims. Representative Ryan Winkler already had a compensation
bill drafted, modeled roughly on the 9/11 Fund, that he intended
8to introduce when the legislature reconvened in February. His
bill, House File 2553, was officially introduced on February 12,
2008.9  Senators Latz, Cohen, Hann, Olseen, and Pogemiller
introduced Senate File 2824, a compensation scheme with a
somewhat different vision, in the Senate on February 18, 2008.10 A
conference committee was appointed and the bill it reported
passed the House and Senate on May 5, 2008. It was signed by
Governor Tim Pawlenty on May 8, 2008.
The purpose of this article is to analyze and compare the 9/11
Fund and the Minnesota bridge-collapse compensation scheme for
purposes of illustrating the necessary components of any future
compensation schemes legislatures consider adopting in cases
involving other catastrophes.
This article first sets out the primary issues that must be
addressed when considering a compensation scheme." It then
examines the choices made in the 9/11 Fund 2 and Minnesota's
7. Press Release, Minnesota Helps-Bridge Disaster Fund, Update (July 29,
2008), available at http://www.minnesotahelps.org/MNHelpsPressKit.pdf.
8. Pam Louwagie, How Should State Help Rebuild Lives?, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Oct. 25, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.startribune.com/
local/I1594381.html.
9. H.R. JOUmRAL 85, Reg. Sess., at 7598 (Minn. 2008), available at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/2007-08/J0212076.pdf.
10. S. JouRNAL 85, Reg. Sess., at 6527 (Minn. 2008), available at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/journals/2007-2008/20080218078.PDF.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infta Part III.
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bridge-collapse compensation scheme. A brief comparison of the
two compensation schemes follows to provide the framework for
considering the components of future compensation schemes.
14
II. DESIGNING A COMPENSATION SCHEME
Consideration of a compensation plan involves a number of
issues.
1. The political question
Whether a legislative response to a catastrophic occurrence is
justified-the political question-is the threshold issue in
determining whether a compensation scheme is an appropriate
response to the occurrence. The problem arises in defining the
criteria for a legislative response, criteria that should be applicable
in other similar cases. Additionally, the threshold question of
whether there should be a legislative response at all-versus
utilizing the tort system-must be answered.
2. Defining the compensable event
In no-fault schemes the compensable event is readily defined.
In workers' compensation it is workplace injury and in no-fault
automobile insurance it is an accident resulting in loss arising out
of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. In cases involving
catastrophes, the catastrophic occurrence itself is the defining
event, but defining the compensable event is only part of the
problem.
3. Coverage
A third problem is determining who is entitled to recover
under the compensation scheme. Beyond the immediate victims of
the catastrophe are numerous individuals and entities who may
sustain loss, including family members, people in close
relationships with victims, or even people who are in business
relationships with the victims. Choosing a model for compensation
presents the potential for creating inherent inequities in the
compensation scheme, depending on how the legislature defines
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
[Vol. 35:2
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individuals or entities who deserve compensation.
4. Compensation
Establishing the type and amount of compensation is also
critical. Schemes might cover personal injury, loss of consortium,
wrongful death, economic loss, and property damage. Damages
might include only economic loss, or also cover damages for
noneconomic loss.
5. Process
The procedure to be utilized in determining who actually
receives compensation and in what amount is critical. A variety of
processes might be implemented, ranging from trial forms to
arbitration. The decision of the entity processing claims may be
final, or there may be administrative or judicial appeal from the
decision.
6. Impact on tort claims
The impact on tort claims is an important factor. A no-fault
compensation scheme could result in a complete bar of actions
against the government that created the compensation scheme, or
the bar could be broader to include other entities as well.
7. Collateral sources
Anyone injured in a catastrophic occurrence will likely have
other sources of compensation available. One of the problems in
defining the amount of compensation to which a victim is entitled
to recover is the treatment of collateral sources. What sources to
deduct from the fund will be a critical factor in determining the
amount of compensation. Deductions could be required from a
variety of sources, including health and life insurance, workers'
compensation benefits, social security benefits, or even funds
received by victims through charitable contributions.
8. Third-party matters
Subrogation and reimbursement are key factors in designing a
compensation scheme. There is a question as to whether the
government providing the compensation should be subrogated to
tort claims the victim has against other potential defendants and if
2009]
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so, for what amount. That decision will turn on the type of
compensation the compensation scheme pays, and on whether the
legislation scheme permits subrogation even if the result is that the
victim receives less than full compensation. Legislation may also
provide for reimbursement of the compensation paid under a plan,
even if no third-party claim is asserted. There is also a question as
to whether other insurers will be entitled to exercise their
subrogation rights against any tort recovery by a victim and if those
subrogation rights are abridged, what the consequences will be.
9. Liability waiver
Legislation providing for compensation would likely include a
waiver of liability against the government if compensation is
accepted. It could condition acceptance on the waiver of other tort
liability as well, or depending on the goals, allow third-party tort
actions without limitation.
III. THE 9/11 FUND
The 9/11 terrorist attacks changed American life forever.
Besides an unparalleled period of national mourning, our
economy is in upheaval, our political system is in turmoil, and we
are involved in a long-term foreign war. The 9/11 attacks,
however, left behind more than just a generation-defining memory
and a bitter taste in the mouths of our citizens.
The 9/11 attacks also left behind a magnanimous legacy,
evidenced by an unprecedented outpouring of American sympathy
and generosity. The residue of this outpouring manifested itself
through Congress' Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act (ATSSSA). 5  While ATSSSA covered various
15. The 9/11 Fund was conceived in the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)). The primary purpose of creating ATSSSA
was to provide assistance to the airline industry. Congress included the 9/11 Fund
"to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a deceased individual)
who was physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001." Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act § 403, 115 Stat. at 237. Congress also created an exclusive federal
cause of action for damages arising out of the terrorist attacks. Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b) (1), 115 Stat. at 240-41. Thus, 9/11
victims have a choice to either file a claim with the Fund or to litigate their claim
in federal court. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 403,
115 Stat. at 237, § 408(b) (1), 115 Stat. at 240-41.
[Vol. 35:2
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issues, it is best known for the provisions compensating the victims
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, commonly known as the September
l1th Victim Compensation Fund. With the Fund now having run
its course, the remaining question is how its legacy will impact
future mass-tort/disaster compensation schemes. An analysis of the
Fund, in conjunction with an analysis of the Minnesota Fund, is
integral to the possible development of similar mass-tort/disaster
schemes in the future.
A. The Scope and Procedural Highlights of the 9/11 Fund
Mass-tort lawsuits are not uncommon to the modern-American
legal framework. In fact, the framework for the Fund was likely
based on the Dalkon Shield litigation of the 1980s and 1990s.
Fortunately, however, there had never been another event like the
9/11 attacks. Almost three thousand people lost their lives in the
attacks, with thousands more injured, making it one of the single
bloodiest peace-time days in our nation's history. 7
Correspondingly, the scope of the Fund was massive.I1
Unfortunately, this also meant that there was no blueprint for
setting up an appropriate compensation fund.
But the number of potential plaintiffs is not what made the
Fund so extraordinary; it was the very nature of the claims, a
massive terrorist attack. The 9/11 attacks were not just attacks on
the specific individuals who suffered, but an attack on the nation as
a whole with the actual victims acting as surrogates for the rest of
America. And that is how the United States and Congress
responded to the tragedy. Instead of staggering in the face of
unprecedented attacks, America sent a message to the world that
the murderers of 9/11 would not achieve their long-term goal of
paralyzing American society, but that instead America would rally
16. See George Rutherglen, Distributing Justice: The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund and the Legacy of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 12 VA. J. Soc.
PoL'Y & L. 673, 674 (2005). The Dalkon Shield litigation resulted in the
formation of the Dalkon Shield Trust, which was set up as an alternative to
litigation for the claimants. Id. at 674-75. This resulted in most claimants getting
expedited results with a fraction of the legal costs. Id. at 676. It also likely saved
the A.H. Robins Co. from dissolution. Id. at 675.
17. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 180-81.
18. Id. at 145.
19. Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 674. For instance, by sheer numbers, the
Fund had a relatively low number of class members-at least compared to the
Dalkon Shield Trust, which numbered over 400,000 class members. Id.
2009]
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around the victims in a showing of patriotic solidarity. °
Although swift and patriotic, it is obvious that very little time
was spent discussing the Fund's underpinnings.2 1 The pressure to
promptly enact legislation was intense. Unfortunately, this haste
also meant that Congress spent very little time fleshing out the
compensation scheme. The result was the Fund's single largest
fundamental flaw; that is, very little was known about the Fund's
particulars when it came time to implement them. This left the
duty of fleshing out the Fund's particulars, both procedurally and
substantively, to those implementing the Fund, primarily Special
Master Kenneth Feinberg. No one, not even someone with
Feinberg's impressive background, had a blueprint for creating
and implementing a fund of this nature because the underlying
events, mass-domestic terrorist attacks, were completely unique to
the nation.
Two of the Fund's characteristics, however, were known from
the outset. First, based on the legislative purpose of saving the
beleaguered airline industry, the primary strategy behind the Fund
21was to persuade potential plaintiffs to opt out of the tort system.
To carry this strategy out, compensation from the Fund had to be
similar to an award obtained via the traditional tort system.4
Correspondingly, the Fund's compensation scheme, at least
statutorily, was centered on the tort system's calculation of damages
to make it attractive enough to potential claimants to entice them
out of the civil-justice system.1
5
Second, due mostly to political issues, the Fund was kept to a
skeletal form. It lacked many substantive details that would have to
be added later. This meant that little substance or procedure was
built into the Fund for fear that an unsuccessful or exorbitant
compensation scheme would create a political fallout. It also
created a situation, however, in which voting against creating a
20. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? 17 (2005) [hereinafter
FEINBERG, WHAT is LIFE WORTH?].
21. The act was passed eleven days after the attacks. Ackerman, supra note 1,
at 143. The first mention of adding the Fund to ATSSSA, however, occurred just
three days before ATSSSA's passing. Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 94, available at 2002 WLNR 4430211.
22. Alexander, supra note 3, at 636.
23. Id. at 633.
24. Id.
25. Id. The Fund's actual compensation scheme, however, differed
significantly from the traditional tort system. This was due, in large part, to the
actions of the Special Master. See infra Part llI.A.l.a.
[Vol. 35:2
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Fund would have been political suicide, due to a strong national
obligation to aid victims. Moreover, the Fund had to appeal to the
victims of 9/11 and to the nation as a whole. To do this it had to
be both generous and expedient, but not a financial free-for-all
that would be unpopular with the taxpaying public. In other
words, it had to balance passion with prudence. As a result, many
of the Fund's initial features-imbedded in its constitution-are
images of mass-tort settlement funds, which highlight the effort
taken by Congress to strike a balance between the passion and
impulse to support the 9/11 victims and the need to be prudent in
creating a responsible compensation structure. While in a typical
mass-tort settlement this would be done by defendants and
plaintiffs reaching a mutually beneficial agreement through a
negotiation process, the Fund was forced to do so artificially and
quickly. The striking of this balance was due, at least in part, to the
involvement of the American Trial Lawyers Association who helped
Congress model the initial frame of the Fund after mass-tort
settlements.2 6  While this satisfied the need for balancing the
passion to generously compensate the 9/11 victims, Congress was
wildly ambiguous in fleshing out the specifics of the Fund. Much
of this vagueness was the result of the Fund being added to ATSSSA
at the eleventh hour and the pressure that was felt to quickly
compensate the 9/11 victims. This was also likely due, however, to
politicians wanting to create as vague a statutory framework as
possible to avoid political fallout should the program prove
controversial or inadequate. Instead, politically speaking, it made
sense to create a statutory framework that put the onus of creating
the Fund's substantive provisions, and therefore the political
liability, on the Special Master.
Because of the uncertainties created by Congress, many
questions remained unanswered about the Fund when it was placed
in Feinberg's hands. The remainder of this section will discuss the
few statutory guidelines provided and highlight the measures
implemented by Feinberg when placing them into a workable
framework.
26. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 48.
2009]
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1. The Fund's Analytical Framework
The framework of the fund as created by Congress and fleshed
out by Kenneth Feinberg2 7 provides an analytical framework that
can be used in considering and structuring future compensation
funds for catastrophic occurrences. The Fund's framework consists
of four parts: (1) establishing the fund; (2) qualifying for the fund;
(3) submitting a claim; and (4) receiving an award. This
framework analyzes, from alpha to omega, the vehicle that carried
an award to the victims of 9/11. Each step is discussed below.
a. Establishing the Fund
As a preliminary matter, the specifics of the Fund needed to be
28determined before the compensation process could begin.
Although Congress debated ATSSSA for days, it hastily added the
Fund to the statute at the eleventh hour.29 As a result, the Fund's
particulars, while well-intentioned, were not well thought out.
Because the Fund was created so quickly by Congress, it
naturally lacked many details necessary for its implication (i.e., who
qualified, how awards were to be determined, any appeals process,
etc.). Creating such details was left to the discretion of Special
Master of the Fund: Kenneth Feinberg.3 °
Congress created the Special Master position to not only
oversee the Fund, but to determine most of the necessary internal
and appeals processes as well."1 Because the statute lacked almost
all substantive detail, Feinberg's influence was integral in running
the Fund. In addition to untrammeled discretion, there was no
congressional or administrative oversight for the policies and
regulations created by Feinberg. 2 In fact, the only check on
Feinberg's authority came from the Attorney General of the United
States, John Ashcroft. 33  Both Feinberg and Ashcroft realized,
however, that this check was almost entirely symbolic given the
27. See infra Part V for a concise comparison of the relevant portions of the
Fund with those of the Minnesota Fund.
28. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 20.
29. Id.
30. Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 674. Feinberg was not completely foreign to
this assignment. He served as a trustee for the Dalkon Shield Trust and was
appointed as the special master for the Agent Orange litigation. Id.
31. Id. at 675.
32. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 65.
33. Id.
[Vol. 35:2
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political realities of firing and replacing the Special Master
combined with Ashcroft having extremely little time for oversight
while embroiled in the post-9/11 war on terror. 4 Unabated
discretion and the lack of any meaningful oversight meant that the
Fund had its own Leviathan in Feinberg.'
Feinberg realized the implications of the power and discretion
that Congress had vested in him.3 6 Not surprisingly, this virtually
unchecked power was the source of some controversy; especially
from families and victims that thought Feinberg had abused his
discretion by doling out insufficient funds.3 7  Feinberg knew
coming into the project, however, that he would have to be vigilant
to create policies and processes that were both fair and easily
understood by laymen.3 ' He also understood, despite the
emotional and magnanimous underpinnings of the Fund, that he
needed to appropriately exercise discretion in limiting the awards
because, after all, taxpayers were footing the bill.39
Unchecked power, however, was not without adverse
consequences for Feinberg. His was the sole name on the
masthead for complaints." Because of this, Feinberg knew that he
alone would bear the lion's share of the inevitable criticisms
flowing from the Fund's application. To offset some of this
criticism, Feinberg volunteered to carry out the Special Master
duties without compensation.4 ' He also took pains to implement
processes to ensure that all potential claimants were well informed
of the Fund's particulars.
Feinberg, it is worth noting, was not foreign to large and
challenging assignments. He had previously served as the Special
Master for the Dalkon Shield litigation, the Special Master/head
34. Id.
35. Id. at 25, 65. Placing this vast amount of power in the hands, albeit quite
capable hands, of one person was a source of concern for many. This
concentration of power was also a concern for many involved in the debates
surrounding the Minnesota Fund. The Minnesota Fund addressed this issue by
diluting the power of the position through a Special Master Panel. See infra Part
W.A.





41. Id. at 25.
42. See discussion infra Part III.A.l.c.v.
43. The term "Special Master" is a common-law term that refers to a judicial
officer appointed to assist the court in some way. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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mediator in the successful settlement of Agent Orange litigation,
an assistant to Ted Kennedy, and the founder of one of the
nation's premier ADR firms.44 Nothing in Feinberg's illustrious
career, however, prepared him for the challenges the Fund would
present. As Feinberg remarked, his work with the Fund was the
most challenging and rewarding experience in his legal career.45
While the Fund received very little implementation guidance
from Congress, there were some core statutory provisions that
shaped the Fund from the outset. The remainder of this section
will detail the statutorily created aspects of the Fund; the other
three sections will detail the policy and procedural requirements
that Feinberg installed.
The statutory underpinnings of the Fund were as few and
powerful as they were ambiguous and unfinished. Or as Feinberg
noted, "[t] he statute was deceptively simple. 46 Without a doubt,
one of the few realized statutory goals behind the Fund was that it
had to be attractive enough to potential plaintiffs to make the tort
system-and its potentially colossal awards-unattractive. Thus,
the primary goal of the Fund was obvious: to create a statutory
system of sticks and carrots to channel victims into the Fund. An
overview of the relevant statutory provisions follows.
First, applying for a claim with the Fund constituted a release
from any liability for all parties that could potentially be held liable
through the tort system, minus, of course, the terrorists responsible
for the tragedy.47 In other words, entering the Fund was equivalent
to accepting an absolute settlement offer in lieu of litigation.
Unlike the tort system and typical settlement funds, however,
1118 (8th ed. 2004).
44. See FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 3-14.
45. Id. at XVI. While all mass-tort litigation and fund distribution is
complicated and often emotional, nothing approaching the appalling and
outrageous acts of 9/11 had ever occurred. Combining the hysteria of the attacks
with the emotions and needs of the victims and their families created a unique
situation that very few could have handled successfully. Further, the bitterness and
hate that often surrounds mass-tort funds was heightened because of the nature of
the attacks and because the Fund was created so soon after the attacks. Id. This
left very little time for victims to grieve or for hate to subside; at least as opposed to
typical mass-tort litigation which plays out for years, if not decades. Feinberg not
only handled this daunting challenge, but excelled where few, if any, others could
have.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, § 405, 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001) (codified as amended 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2006)).
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entering the Fund took away any possible tort options for victims.
Additionally, it also retroactively capped tort liability for any
potential tortfeasors and set stringent jurisdictional and
substantive-law restrictions. This meant that the Fund was offered
as an alternative to the tort system, with teeth. This approach had
the advantage of insulating the airlines, the World Trade Center
(WTC) property owners, and perhaps the government, from
liability. It also provided victims an alternative to litigation that was
both light years faster than traditional litigation and much cheaper.
Conversely, it was funded by billions of dollars of taxpayers' money
that, theoretically, should have instead come from potential
litigants, such as the airline industry, via the tort system. Many
skeptics of the Fund saw it as little more than a government-backed
bailout of the airline industry that warped traditional tort-
settlement funds. This view isn't unfounded considering that
ATSSSA was initially promulgated to save the beleaguered airline
industry and considering the restrictions placed on the tort
alternative. But the Fund's generous and sympathetic undertones
quieted most of its critics, especially given the dismal chances the
489/11 victims faced at recovering via the tort system.
Second, financial incentives were created to discourage victims
from pursuing their claims through the tort system. Those who
opted to bring a lawsuit instead of a Fund claim were subject to
damage limitations if the suit was against the airline industry or
41WTC property owners. Specifically, the airlines' liability was
48. The Fund is a much better choice for victims than tort litigation because
applying the risk/utility equation developed by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), will likely prevent
victims from establishing proximate cause. Specifically, victims will be unable to
prove the airlines were the proximate cause of their injuries. The inquiry will
focus on three questions. Joe Ward, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund:
The Answer to Victim Relief., 4 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 161, 173 (2003). First, "what
types of harm did the airlines reasonably foresee at that time of the allegedly
tortious conduct?" Id. Second, "is the type of harm actually caused to the victims
not physically in the planes . . . one of the types of harm identified in the first
query?" Id. Third, "was the harm actually suffered sufficiently probable to occur
and sufficiently grave to the extent that it is proper to render the airlines' conduct
tortious?" Id. Because it is unlikely that all three can be answered in the
affirmative, proximate cause does not exist and victims would be unable to
recover. Id. at 162, 173-74.
49. Id. at 166. All claims needed to be brought in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, in Manhattan. Id. Additionally, any
liability for the airlines or other entities sued was limited to the amount of their
insurance reimbursements. Id. Thus, filing a suit outside of the Fund was very
unattractive.
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capped at the policy limits of their respective insurance policies.50
Also, no punitive damages were allowed. M Additionally, the costs
and associated attorney's fees that would be incurred through
litigation created a sizable deterrent in the face of the Fund. This
was especially true given the alternative of entering the Fund's user-
friendly and cost-effective environs. Thus, there is no doubt that
entering the Fund was much cheaper for victims.
Third, the applicable substantive law and jurisdiction were set
52
by statute for those choosing not to enter the Fund. Congress
achieved this by reserving a tort remedy in the ATSSSA for those
opting not to enter the Fund.5" This reservation, however,
contained several restrictions that, once again, were likely meant to
channel victims into the Fund. To begin, the government
mandated that any lawsuits involving potential 9/11 tortfeasors had
54
to be brought in federal court in Manhattan. In addition to
giving exclusive jurisdiction to federal court in New York, it limited
the substantive law to that of the respective crash sites (New York,
Pennsylvania, or Washington, D.C.), except where preempted by
federal law.5  Notably, the jurisdictional and substantive
restrictions applied to all victims whose claims arose from the 9/11
terrorist attacks, not just those that could opt into the Fund but
chose not to.
56
50. About $6 billion was available for those seeking tort remedies against
American and United Airlines, the two airlines involved in the 9/11 crashes. Erin
G. Holt, The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 513,514 (2004).
51. Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 690. The goal of punitive damages is to
create a deterrent effect on the tortfeasor or future tortfeasors. When the source
of the compensating fund is the federal government, however, the awarding of
punitive damages has no deterrent effect at all-especially considering that the
government did not admit fault and most do not think that it was at fault because
the attacks were terror related. See id.
52. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408, 115 Stat. at
240-41.
53. Id.
54. As a result of the restrictions placed on the tort system and the lure of the
Fund, approximately seventy claims have been brought by those that qualified for
the Fund. George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN.
ST. L. REv. 175, 188 (2007). As mandated by ATSSSA, all of these claims have
been brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, located in Manhattan. See id.
55. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408, 115 Stat. at
240-41.
56. Conk, supra note 54, at 188. To be subject to the jurisdictional and
substantive restrictions, the named defendants in the complaint had to be an
airline, airport security company, and/or the Port Authority of New York or New
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Finally, unlike most mass-tort compensation funds, the Fund
did not contain a limited amount of money; 57 thus making the Fund
more palatable by not limiting the amount of payments to potential
claimants. 5s Additionally, it also differed from most funds because
the Fund creators and administrators did not have a financial
incentive to award conservative payments.59
Congress took steps through the Fund, although in a
seemingly light-handed manner, to ensure that a compensation
system would be put in place to adequately compensate the 9/11
victims in an efficient manner. Thus, because Congress seemingly
had the best interests of the 9/11 victims in mind when
promulgating the Fund and took several steps to ensure fairness,
the Fund's procedural integrity was entrenched from the
beginning.
Jersey. Id. at 188-89. Thousands of these claims have been brought in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and are now
consolidated for discovery and other pre-trial proceedings. Id. at 189. Among
these cases are: "(i) [I]n re September 11 Litigation, 21 MC 97 (AKH), claims
brought by passengers and ground victims of the September 11 attacks; (ii) In re
September 11 Litigation, 21 MC 101 (AKH), claims brought by property owners
whose property was damaged as a result of the September 11 attacks; (iii) In re
World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 21 MC 100 (AKH), claims brought by
those who came to the World Trade Center disaster site to assist with the debris
removal effort following the September 11 attacks; (iv) In re World Trade Center
Disaster Site Litigation, 21 MC 102 (AKH), claims brought by those who assisted
with the debris removal effort at sites other than the WTC site following the
September 11 attacks." Id. Most of these cases either relate to property or to
those suffering injuries that did not qualify for compensation under the Fund. Id.
These injuries were primarily related to the cleanup undertakings, rescue
activities, and airborne diseases that took days, months, or even years to manifest
themselves in the aftermath of the attacks. Id. at 200-02.
57. Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 679-80.
58. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at XVI. Even this portion
of the Fund was not without some controversy. Some legislators, including
Senator Don Nickels of Oklahoma, were concerned about forming a dangerous
precedent of government funding substituting the civil justice system with runaway
compensation for potential tort victims at the expense of taxpayers. Id. at 35. This
seemed like a legitimate concern in the face of an unprecedented Fund whose
Special Master was essentially given a blank check and discretion to dole money
out as he saw fit-especially with the public sentiment of generous giving, or
vengeful philanthropy, pushing the spirit of the Fund. As a result, the statute was
amended to offset award amounts with collateral payments. Id. at 35-36. Of
course the collateral offset portion of the Fund met widespread disdain. This
controversial portion of the Fund is discussed infta Part III.C. 1.
59. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 25-26.
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b. Qualifying for the Fund
On the day of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, almost three thousand
people died and thousands more were injured. In the days and
weeks that followed, the number of injured grew by the thousands
as workers carried out dangerous rescue and cleanup efforts.
6
0
Additionally, billions of dollars in property was destroyed or
damaged. Because of the massive range and amount of injuries,• 61
the scope of the Fund had to be limited in order to be practical.
The legislative requirements for entering the fund were simple:
those injured in the attacks qualified, as did family members of• 62
those who died. Also, Congress did little to limit potential
claimants; the Fund applied broadly, allowing citizens of foreign
countries and illegal aliens to apply. Victims of property
destruction, however, did not qualify for the Fund, thereby
excluding a number of costly claims. 64 While qualifying sounded
simple, in reality there were four primary problems in deciding
who qualified for the Fund.
60. Conk, supra note 54, at 198-201. The Fund's limited scope, in relation to
injuries outside of the Fund's seventy-two hour period, continues to remain
controversial. In addition to 9/11 being the worst terrorist attack on our country,
it was also the worst environmental disaster to ever befall New York City. Id. at
178-79. The collapse of the WTC towers released thousands of toxins, such as
asbestos, lead, PCBs, and dioxins, into Manhattan's air. Id. at 179. After the
collapse, thousands of workers labored for months in the toxic air, many without
adequate respiratory protection. Id. at 198-200. Additionally, there was little or
no training and no formal health plan for the workers until months after the
cleanup had begun. Id. at 199-200. Nearly all the workers reported some health
problems; many reported serious problems. Id. at 200. Unfortunately, these
claims were excluded from the Fund because they arose outside of the seventy-two-
hour period that limited the Fund's scope-leaving the tort system to compensate
the thousands of workers suffering from serious illness and disease. Id. at 202-03.
Currently, over three thousand workers have filed claims because of illness and
disease related to the cleanup of the WTC towers. Id. at 202. These claims come
within the jurisdiction of ATSSSA and are currently in federal court in the
Southern District of New York. Id. at 202-04. ATSSSA also limited New York
City's liability to $350 million or its insurance coverage limits, whichever is greater.
Id. at 204. Congress also established the WTC Captive Insurance Company, Inc.,
with a coverage limit of $1 billion, to protect contractors against personal injury
claims arising out of the cleanup of ground zero. Id. at 204.
61. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 144-46.
62. Id. at 144.
63. See FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at XVII-XXI.
64. Alexander, supra note 3, at 686 (explaining that Congress reacted to the
massive property damage problem by enacting the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002), to ensure that compensation
would be readily available through insurance programs and federal subsidies).
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First, some questioned even this broad application of the
Fund, calling it too narrow, asking why only the victims of the 9/11• 65
attacks were being compensated. These questions were not
unsubstantiated. For example, the victims of the Oklahoma City
bombings, the first WTC bombings, the U.S.S. Cole attack, and the
bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were
66never compensated by the government through a similar fund.
Therefore, there was a push from several fronts to expand the
61scope of the Fund to include victims of other terrorist attacks.
Some even advocated for establishing a permanent fund for victims
of terrorist attacks. 6' This highlights one of the toughest questions
in creating the Fund or future funds, which is where to draw the
line on who to compensate. Highly tragic events tend to spur the
emotions and hearts of society because thousands of innocent
victims have died or been injured. Yet there are thousands of other
victims that suffer similar fates but not in the same highly
sensationalized manner. It makes us ask: Why these victims and not
others? It is a tough question, and one that those creating future
funds reluctantly must face.
Second, it was not clear who qualified to recover under the
Fund. The Fund defined eligible claimants as those present at the
crash scenes or, in the case of a death claim, "the personal
representative of the decedent[J,]69 who had to be appointed as the
65. See FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 21-22.
66. Kenneth Feinberg, The Building Blocks of Successful Victim Compensation
Programs, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 273, 274 (2005) [hereinafter Feinberg,
Building Blocks].
67. For example, Senator Charles Schumer of New York tried to persuade
Feinberg to expand the scope to include the victims of the first WTC bombings in
1993. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 66.
68. BetsyJ. Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief: A Proposal for a Permanent
Compensation System for Domestic Terrorist Victims, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 663
passim (2006). Grey argues that "[t]he rationales supporting the establishment of
the September Ilth Fund and other permanent domestic and international
compensation funds support the idea that the United States should establish a
terrorism compensation fund on a permanent basis." Id. at 669. Grey bases the
need for a permanent fund on the assumption that terrorist attacks on the United
States will continue. Id. With that assumption in mind, she argues that "[w]ith all
the precautions and protocols the United States has instituted in the name of
homeland security, establishing a permanent compensation system for victims of
terrorism is a logical step in preparing the Nation if it finds itself in the midst of
another terror-related crisis." Id.
69. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, § 405(c) (2) (C), 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2006)).
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personal representative or administrator of the decedent's estate,
usually by a valid will. 7° If no such person had been appointed by
will, as was common, the default claimant was determined by the
intestacy statutes of the jurisdiction in which the decedent was
domiciled. This procedure was arguably the only way to
efficiently carry out the program." It was not, however, without
faults.73 For instance, there were situations where the decedent had
lived with a partner for years, yet the official claimant would be
someone who had little or no contact with the decedent.4 Some
opposing claimants litigated outside of the Fund in state courts to
determine the reception of the Fund award, despite the best efforts
of Feinberg's expert mediation endeavors.7 5 Again, there likely was
no other way to efficiently carry out the program, and in most cases
76
it was a non-issue.
The third problem concerned which people with injuries
qualified for the Fund. Coupled with the inherent administrative
difficulties in making such a determination, this topic was highly
controversial. 7  The Fund limited injury claimants to those who
suffered physical injury, rejecting claims for those with solely• 78
emotional or mental harm. Moreover, the Fund originally limited
eligibility to those who had been at the scene of the attacks and
were injured during or immediately afterward.' 9 It further limited
eligibility to those who were treated at a hospital within twenty-four
hours of the attacks."s The consequence of this initial limiting
provision was the exclusion of many firefighters, policemen, rescue
workers, and concerned citizens who were injured in the aftermath
of the attacks because they were rescuing or aiding victims."' This
harsh turn on the heroes of 9/11 created an uproar. In response,
70. Alexander, supra note 3, at 678.
71. Id.
72. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 165.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 69 (explaining Feinberg's resolution techniques when
confronted with such situations).
76. Id. (describing that many families agreed with the allocation and
distribution of the award).
77. Id. at 39.
78. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, § 405(c)(1)-(2), 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2006)).
79. Id.
80. Alexander, supra note 3, at 684.
81. Id.
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the Fund was amended to allow for injuries that were treated within
seventy-two hours of the attacks. This provision was still
controversial, however, because numerous injuries either arose or
were treated after the seventy-two hour period.
8
3
The fourth problem concerned determining the amount of
time a claimant had to enter the Fund.s4 All claimants had to enter
the Fund within two years of the Fund's effective date.15 This did
not seem to be a hindrance to many, if any, eligible claimants
because the vast majority brought claims within the statutory
86period.
c. Submitting a Claim
After filing a claim, the Fund's procedural underbelly kicked
into action, and Fund staff carefully evaluated each claimant's case.
Some of these procedures were laid out by statute; most of them
were created by Feinberg. The more interesting and relevant of
these procedures are outlined below.
i. Individual Evaluators
Upon submission, a claimant's file was sent to a claims
evaluator to determine eligibility. Given the massive scope of the
Fund, Feinberg realized from the outset that he would need a large
staff that he could trust."" Feinberg's first step was to secure a core
staff that could help him build the large network necessary to• • 89
administer the Fund. To do this, Feinberg relied heavily on both
the top lawyers at his prestigious law firm and a few of the Bush
administration's apolitical lawyers. 9' The core staff, through a
public bidding process, then chose the accounting firm
82. 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(c)(1) (2008).
83. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 160. These injuries were mainly breathing
problems, caused by particles and chemicals in the air that remained for days after
the attacks. Id. Additionally, it is possible that many of the rescue and cleanup
workers that toiled for days, weeks, and even months afterward may develop health
problems in the future. Id.
84. Id. at 161.
85. Id. at 144. This resulted in a filing deadline of December 22, 2003. Id.
86. Id. at 180. Over 97% of the 2976 eligible claims were brought within the
statutory period. Id. A large number of those claimants entered the Fund less
than one month before the deadline. Id.
87. Alexander, supra note 3, at 669.
88. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 31.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 31-33.
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PriceWaterhouseCoopers to handle all of the Fund's fiscal
responsibilities."' The next step, choosing the staff that would
implement the Fund's procedures and evaluate its awards, was the
most challenging. Creating this part of the Fund was equivalent to
constructing the body's nervous system. The claims evaluators and
staff in the offices that were created throughout the east coast and
California were equivalent to the nerves and cells, taking in all of
the claimants' information, answering questions, distributing
information, and analyzing the awards. 92 Feinberg was the brain of
the operation, taking in all of the relevant information from the
evaluators and staff, processing it into one final award, and then
sending the award back to the branch offices for distribution to the
claimants. 93
Because of the importance Feinberg placed on the decisions of
these individual evaluators, choosing them wisely was critically
important to the Fund's integrity. Initially, forty-one of these
subordinate officers were chosen, all directly by Feinberg.' Hand
picking the evaluators proved to be somewhat controversial
because it further cemented the Leviathanesque grip that Feinberg
had on the Fund. Ultimately, however, it helped ensure that the
speed and efficiency of the process would not be jeopardized due
to conflicting evaluative philosophies.
ii. Speed
The speed of the Fund was perhaps its greatest feature. Under
ATSSSA, all claims were guaranteed, for better or worse, to be
decided upon and distributed within 120 days of being filed.95 This
was years faster than the time required to take a claim to its
conclusion through the tort system. It assured that any award
would be received by the victims quickly, alleviating the time and
worry of trying to collect ajudgment through the tort system.
Evaluating claims, even with the utilization of presumptive
guidelines, was not an easy process. The amount of information
and care that went into each claim was impressive. For instance,
91. Id. at 33.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 87.
94. Alexander, supra note 3, at 669.
95. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405(b) (3), 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2006)).
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the Fund staff had to evaluate tax returns, W-2 wage and tax
statements, pension plans, social security records, insurance
contracts, workers' compensation awards, bonuses from employers,
death benefits, and charitable contributions. Additionally,
Feinberg had to decide if the amounts that were calculated
corresponded with the goals and spirit driving the Fund; he looked
at the calculated awards and decided to increase or decrease the
amount in an attempt to "narrow the gap" between award
amounts.97
Even with the Fund's rapid claims resolution, some 9/11
victim families still experienced financial difficulty. Many of these
problems, however, were offset in two ways. First, the charitable
outpouring from the American public was tremendous."' Billions
of dollars poured into dozens of charities.99 Second, an emergency
prong of the Fund was created to quickly get money into the hands
of those in need. 100 The idea was to get financially strapped
families on their feet while the Fund's particulars were ironed out.
The emergency funds were then credited to the award they
ultimately received from the Special Master.' Oddly, only 236
families took part in the emergency prong of the Fund. 10 This was
due, in large part, to the unprecedented flow of money from the
American public to various charitable organizations. 103
96. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 80.
97. The idea of "narrowing the gap" was a pervasive theme that Feinberg
incorporated into award determination. See id. at 51.
98. See Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to September
11 Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief 36 IND. L. REv. 251, 251, 284 (2003);
Kenneth P. Nolan & Jeanne M. O'Grady, The Victim Compensation Fund-Looking a
Gift Horse in the Mouth, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 231, 247 (2003).
99. The U.S. General Accounting Office estimates that $2.4 billion was raised
by thirty-four charities within the first year of the attack. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-02-1037, SEPTEMBER 11: INTERIM REPORT ON THE RESPONSE OF
CHARITIES 36 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO21037.pdf.
100. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 45.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The term "vengeful philanthropy" was coined by Jack Rosenthal, the
head of the New York Times Foundation, to describe the phenomenon of
Americanism that resulted after 9/11. Id. at 70. Most charities, unfortunately, did
not have the capability of distributing the massive amounts of money that poured
into their understaffed offices. Katz, supra note 98, at 25-254. Most of these
problems were purely logistical, with many charitable organizations simply lacking
the infrastructure and manpower to effectively administer America's "vengeful
philanthropy." Id. As a result, the river of money flowing into charitable
organizations experienced difficulty finding its way into the hands of thousands of
victims and their families. Id. Fortunately, given the pure amount donated, the
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Additionally, further steps were taken to streamline the
process by giving claimants the option of entering the Fund via two
distinctive tracks, Track A and Track B. 104 Entering through Track
A, a claims evaluator would determine a claimant's eligibility and
the claimant's presumed award within forty-five days of filing.1
5
After receiving the award, the claimant could either accept it or
request a hearing before the Special Master or his designee.W
6
Conversely, under Track B, the claims evaluator would determine
eligibility only, again within forty-five days; eligible claimants would
then proceed directly to a hearing with the Special Master.0 7
Also, under Track B, claimants could arrange evidence and
other materials to influence the Special Master; making it similar to
a binding arbitration. Not surprisingly, the more elaborate
procedures under Track B were chosen with higher frequency
among those with death (opposed to injury) claims and also with
victims that had the potential for large claims.'0 9 Track A allowed
simpler claims with the procedural safeguard of an internal appeal
to the Special Master for unfavorable determinations." 0 Even those
appealing their decisions to the Special Master were guaranteed to
have a decision within 120 days, a significantly faster resolution
than claimants would achieve through the tort system."'
iii. Finality
Procedurally, the biggest complaint about the Fund was its
finality, or lack of an appeals process. 112 Submitting a claim sent
the 9/11 victims down an irreversible trail. The language of the
impact of private charities greatly reduced the necessity of an emergency
government fund.




108. Id. at 155-56.
109. Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 699. The claimants filing under the death
provision were able to attain awards based on the salary levels of the decedents.
This meant that those earning higher salaries typically received higher awards. As
a corollary, these claimants typically would apply directly to the Special Master for
a more in-depth hearing under Track B. Id. at 698-99.
110. Id.at698-99.
111. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405 (b)(3), 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 (2006)).
112. Id. (stating that all decisions reached by the Special Master are final and
not subject to judicial review).
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Fund mandated that the Special Master's final decision was exactly
that: final. Once in the system, an unhappy claimant under Track
A1 3 could appeal to the Special Master for an individual hearing.
Claimants choosing Track B, however, were allowed no further
redress and were bound to the amount determined by the Special
Master. 11 In either case, the buck stopped with the Special Master.
Thus, this provision of the Fund proved controversial because
victims that were unhappy with an award amount were left with no
viable options because of the statutory mandate that all decisions
were final.
The absolute nature of the Fund also had the collateral effect
of placing claimants, particularly families of high wage earners, in a
state of apprehension." 5 Feinberg made it a goal to "narrow the
gap" between awards for those earning a janitor's salary and those
earning millions of dollars per year; despite Congress' mandate
that earning potential play a part in the award calculation.
Specifically, Feinberg told families of high wage earners that their
awards would reach nothing close to the amounts they would
receive in a successful tort suit."7 For instance, Feinberg made it
very clear that families of ultra-high wage earners would not receive
the $20 or $30 million awards that they might receive in a
successful tort suit."" These families, of course, would not be able
to pursue tort claims if they entered the Fund. This was
problematic because they would not know the award they would
receive by entering the Fund until already committed to its
result. 119
In contrast, most traditional forms of ADR are either non-
binding,20 or at the very least can be appealed on grounds of fraud,
113. See supra Part III.A.l.c for a more in-depth discussion of the two-track
system.
114. Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 698-99.
115. See FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 51-52.
116. Id.
117. Stephen Landsman, A Chance to be Heard: Thoughts About Schedules, Caps,
and Collateral Source Deductions in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 393, 401-02 (2003). Feinberg noted that "multi-million dollar
awards out of the public coffers are not necessary to provide [high wage earner
families] with a strong economic foundation from which to rebuild their lives." Id.
at 402 (quoting September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim
Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,278 (Dec. 21, 2001)).
118. SeeFEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 51-52.
119. See Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 698-99.
120. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. § 114.02(a) (1) (2008).
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prejudice, or malice 2-'-and participants have the option of not
reaching an agreement. The Fund's finality, of course, has
generated a huge amount of criticism."' The obvious catch is that
if appeals were allowed, the Fund's goals of speed, efficiency, and
cost-effectiveness would be frustrated.
The restrictions on substantive law, jurisdiction, and liability
added to the Fund's potential claimants' predicament. They faced
uncertain and irreversible results by entering the Fund. Yet, the
alternative tort environment was hostile, subject to several
restrictions, and the possibility of pinning liability on any potential
tortfeasors was, at best, dubious. Notably, some of the fear of the
Fund's finality was offset by Feinberg. Knowing that the finality of
the Fund was controversial and worrisome to potential claimants,
Feinberg sought a proactive solution to the problem."' Instead of
forcing potential claimants to blindly make a choice between the
Fund and the tort system, he offered to give claimants an estimate
on their potential award."'
iv. Cost-Effectiveness
While fees for any legal matter can be extremely costly, these
costs were largely absent for claimants entering the Fund, thereby,
making it a much more attractive alternative than the tort system.
The Fund was constructed so that claimants would have little
trouble representing themselves pro se.126 But, if claimants wanted
assistance, it was provided pro bono or at greatly reduced rates-
one of the most championed provisions of the Fund. This direct
representation was provided by a pro bono "case manager" forS 127 ..
claimants. The Trial Lawyers Care organization (TLC) provided
the representation. 121 In addition, lawyers who were handling the
121. See generally id. § 114.08; MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2006).
122. See, e.g., FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 78-79
(discussing the criticism coming from the victims' families); Alexander, supra note
3, at 630-36 (highlighting the procedural deficiencies of the Fund caused by its
expedited enactment); Landsman, supra note 117, at 399-401 (describing the
finality of the Special Master's decisions and how Feinberg's approach altered the
legislative mandate of the Fund).
123. See FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 78.
124. Id. at 79.
125. Alexander, supra note 3, at 644-45.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 643-44.
128. TLC was created in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks so that victims
and their families would not be subject to large legal fees that would significantly
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cases for a fee did so at greatly reduced rates.'2 This accentuated
the cost-effective and victim-friendly nature of the Fund. This was
especially important given the dramatic nature of the attacks. It
would not look benevolent, and indeed it may have eroded the
Fund's magnanimous underpinnings, if lawyers were receiving a
third of the awards. This, of course, is in addition to the negative
perception the public would have had of a taxpayer-based
compensation scheme that padded the wallets of thousands of
lawyers instead of directly benefiting the victims of 9/11.
This also fell in line with the goal of making the Fund more
attractive than the traditional tort system to potential claimants.
Moreover, other than cutting the vast majority of legal fees
associated with litigation, the Fund also cut filing, court, and/or
ADR fees that accompany the traditional pathways.3 °  Most
importantly, however, it also presented awards to claimants tax-free;
thereby, increasing the amount of awards given by billions of
dollars. These aspects of the Fund assured that cost and time
would not adversely affect claimants, keeping in-tune with the
Fund's altruistic underpinnings, and would also make the Fund a
much more attractive option than the tort system. Specifically, by
ensuring the Fund's speed and cost-effectiveness, along with its no-
fault foundation, the claimants were afforded a quick, generous,
and risk-free award; an alternative much more attractive than the
traditional tort system."'
cut into their award amounts. TLC was created by the Association of Trial Lawyers
of America (ATLA) shortly after the passing of ATSSSA. See Trial Lawyers Care,
http://www.911lawhelp.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2009). In doing this, Leo V. Boyle,
then president of ATLA, wrote Congress with the promise of providing "free legal
services to any family wishing to pursue justice through the fund established by
this unprecedented, humanitarian legislation." Id. TLC "became the largest
single pro bono project in the history of American jurisprudence. Over 1100
lawyers provided representation to over 1700 victim's families-over $200 million
in legal services provided absolutely free of charge." Id.
129. This is likely to the credit of Feinberg who, in his final report, cautioned
that attorneys taking a contingent fee of larger than 5% would erode the meaning
and purpose behind the Fund. In addition, those taking contingent fees were
carefully watched by the courts to make sure the fees were within the spirit of the
Fund. See Conk, supra note 54, at 187. See, e.g., In re Gomez, 785 N.Y.S.2d 866,
867-68 (2004) (in which the court scrutinized contingent fees less than 10%).
Feinberg led by example through the donation of not only his services, but those
of his law firm, in excess of 19,000 hours. Conk, supra note 54, at 187.
130. See Conk, supra note 54, at 187.
131. Id. at 183-87.
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v. Heightened Notice Requirements
The notice requirements for the Fund went above and beyond
standards for typical legal procedures.' One key component of
heightened notice was the importance Feinberg placed on
transparency, openness, and the need for claimants to be apprised
of the Fund's particulars.3 3  For instance, Feinberg and his
designees held a great number of public meetings, meetings with
groups of claimants, and constructed a website to apprise potential
claimants of all the procedures and details of the Fund. 34 Feinberg
went through these elaborate steps to ensure the widest
dissemination of information about the Fund as possible.
135
Additionally, Feinberg offered to meet personally with any
potential claimant who had questions or concerns about the
Fund. 13 Feinberg took these steps to ensure that the Fund's public
face would be someone who was familiar with the Fund's
particulars and who was willing to meet personally with victims and
their families. 1
37
Overall, the Fund had several procedural safeguards in place
to ensure the speed, efficiency, low cost, and fairness of the
process. Besides heightened notice requirements, it had an
internal appeals process, expedient turnarounds, an easy to use
format, and free legal representation. The process was very similar
to binding arbitration. You bring evidence and a claim to an
"evaluator," he views that evidence, and then he makes a binding
decision. Claimants had knowledge of the process' requirements,
how claims were evaluated, and the fact that it was binding was
known ahead of time due to Feinberg's dedication to openness and
transparency. It differs from arbitration, however, in a few
controversial ways. As an absolute, a claimant could not challenge
132. See Feinberg, Building Blocks, supra note 66, at 275.
133. See id. at 274-75; FEINBERG, WHAT IS LiFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 46-47.
Feinberg states that "[i]f you tell 9/11 families, 'You get an award; that's it, you
can't go to court,' every intuitive bone in my body says, 'That won't work. It will
never work.' There has to be a sense of fairness and openness to the program. Do
not underestimate the importance of procedure in the design of these programs.
You must give claimants a sense that they are involved in the process. This idea
that an award will come on down from on high and you'll take it and like it
doesn't sit well with families or with any consumer of a designed program."
Feinberg, Building Blocks, supra note 66, at 274-75.
134. See FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 47-50.
135. Id. at47.
136. Feinberg, Building Blocks, supra note 66, at 275.
137. See FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 49.
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the decision of the Special Master in court. 18 And rules affecting
the alternative, i.e. litigation, made it difficult to avoid entering the
Fund. Again, these restraints were likely created out of necessity to
ensure that the goals of the Fund remained intact.
B. Compensation
The Fund was also unique in its process for determining the
substance or value of claims. The biggest question surrounding the
Fund was how claims would be decided. This answer would shape
the decision of many claimants pondering whether to enter the
Fund or seek traditional tort remedies.
1. Claim Determination
To begin with, the Fund was created on a no-fault basis.
39
This meant that the government created the Fund without
admitting wrongdoing on its own behalf or any other party's
behalf. More importantly, however, it also meant that claimants
would not have to prove any of the traditional elements of
negligence (duty, breach, etc.), except damages. Thus, any
claimants meeting the threshold eligibility requirements per se
were entitled to an award. This is comparable to no-fault workers-
compensation systems and no-fault automobile insurance systems.
The question then became how to attach a value to the
individual claims. The biggest debate surrounding this question
was whether to use a traditional tort approach to deciding damages
or a government-benefits-based approach. This question was
paramount because the individual award amounts could vary
greatly in the two systems. For instance, if the awards were
distributed as in a government-benefits system, the awards would
likely be identical (or very similar) for most claimants, just as they
are for disability, welfare, no-fault insurance, or social security
benefits. Under a tort approach, however, the awards would be
based on the individual circumstances of each claimant-meaning
that income, dependents, age, and special circumstances would
138. Feinberg, Building Blocks, supra note 66, at 274. Though the statute
precluded judicial appeals, Feinberg created an administrative appeal process. Id.
at 274-75.
139. See Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 98, at 235.
140. See Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Princples in the Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAULL. REv. 719, 724 (2003).
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come into play. This approach results in a wide range of award
amounts, due mainly to vast differences in income of the
claimants. 141
The Special Master was required by the Fund to take into
account the individual circumstances of the victims. 142  He did,
however, have substantial discretion in deciding how to interpret
those circumstances. 14 The result was a blend of the tort system
and a government-benefits system, with a leaning towards tort-
based determinations. In this way the Fund was similar to a mass-
tort settlement fund, in that it tended to flatten out the differences
in award amounts; eliminating the high-end tort awards some
claimants may have received, but also giving higher amounts to low-... . . 44
income claimants and those suffering injuries. This result can be
directly attributed to the great pains Feinberg took to "narrow the
gap" in awards.145  He did so to incorporate the altruistic spirit
underlying the Fund. 146 While awarding everyone the same amount
was expressly forbidden by statute, Feinberg used his discretion to
successfully narrow the gap between the wealthy, middle-class, and• 147
poor claimants. To best highlight the end result, the substantive
141. See FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 36. There was great
disparity among the income of claimants. Id. For instance, the WTC had
individual victims, such as top executives for Cantor Fitzgerald, who earned
millions per year. Id. at 51. The WTC, however, also had janitors and
undocumented aliens working on its ground level who made less than $20,000 per
year. If a pure tort-award analysis were used, the top end of the spectrum would
have seen awards between $10 and $50 million, while the low end would have seen
awards with less than $250,000. Id. Avoiding this kind of disparity was a pointed
goal of Feinberg's. Id. at 47, 91. Developing this goal can be traced, at least in
part, to the advice of Feinberg's former employer, Ted Kennedy, who told him
"Ken, just make sure that 15 percent of the families don't receive 85 percent of
the taxpayers' money." Id. at 47.
142. Id. at 34-35.
143. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
10742, § 404, 115 Stat. 230, 237-38 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §
40101 (2006)).
144. Alexander, supra note 3, at 650.
145. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 91.
146. Id.
147. Id. While Congress mandated that the Special Master factor income into
the awards, it also granted the Special Master great discretion to create the system
in which awards would ultimately be determined. Feinberg, wielding his sword of
discretion, ultimately decided that Congress had created the compensation with
the intention of distributing awards similarly across the board, despite the wide
range in incomes of 9/11 victims and the language included in the Fund's
statutory underpinnings. Feinberg made this policy very clear, despite harsh
criticism, to the family members of wealthy victims. As Feinberg later reflected:
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basis for deciding claims is broken into two categories: economic
loss and noneconomic loss.
a. Economic Loss
Under the Fund, economic losses included earnings,
employment benefits, replacement services, and burial costs, to
name a few. 14  These economic losses mirrored the losses that
would be comparable under most states' tort systems. 149  For
example, to predetermine awards, Feinberg created presumptive
tables based on income, which included figures for those who
ranked within the ninety-eighth percentile of earned wages in
America. 150 Those earning more than the ninety-eighth percentile
could either accept an award at that level or apply to the Special
Master and present evidence of why they should be entitled to an
upward deviation from the scales. T5 Not surprisingly, this proved
highly controversial because many of those who died in the WTC
were above the ninety-eighth percentile mark. 
152
On the other side, the scales drew criticism because many
thought that the victims who were in the most need of financial
assistance should be given higher awards. This system would have
been more similar to a government-benefits program such as
welfare. This presents an important question: Why should the
victims be placed in better financial situations than they were
I had to dash expectations that the families of wealthy wage earners
would receive tens of millions of dollars. I pulled no punches. I made it
very clear-much to the anger of some high-income survivors and their
representatives, like Howard Lutnik, chairman of the board and chief
executive officer of Cantor Fitzgerald-that payouts in the double-digit
millions (or anything close to that) were extremely unlikely. Instead, I
would exercise my discretion to reduce the gap between high-income
and low-income families. If a calculation based on lost income resulted
in a figure of $10, $20, or $50 million after offsets, I would reduce the
award to an amount I believed was more reasonable and in line with what
Congress intended.
Id. at 51. Feinberg further remarked that "awards exceeding $3 million would be
,exceedingly rare' and would require 'extraordinary circumstances."' This was,
again, despite the Fund's statutory underpinnings prohibiting a cap on awards
based on income. Id. at 50-51.
148. Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 98, at 239-40.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 240. The ninety-eighth percentile amounted to roughly $231,000 at
the time. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 240-41.
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before the attacks? For instance, under a benefits-based system, a
thirty-five-year-old making $150,000 and a fifty-five-year-old making
$20,000 would receive the same award. In other words, investment
bankers and janitors could receive the same award regardless of the
drastic differences in their incomes. This would run counter to a
tort-based system that would at least attempt to calculate actual
damages.
The presumptive guidelines were based on tort principles,
primarily income and age. The damages awarded varied
depending on the career and age of the individual based on
actuarial tables, similar to the means with which traditional tort
awards and tort settlement awards are fashioned. 1
54
While at first glance the economic-loss portion of the awards
appeared to be based solely on the tort model, in reality many
awards were altered to evenly distribute compensation. This
occurred in two ways. First, as mentioned above, Feinberg
purposely limited high-end awards. Second, he also inflated awards
that were minimal-primarily those that were low-wage earners or
mid-wage earners subject to significant collateral offsets. This fit
with Feinberg's goal of narrowing the gap between the wealthy and
poor claimants to come in line with Congress' intent and the spirit
of the Fund.
Narrowing the gap also served the purpose of making every
award meaningful to the claimants. For instance, hundreds of
claims were based on injury or death of primarily mid- to low-wage
earners with life insurance, which would have required only a
nominal award because of the Fund's collateral-offset provision.
To combat this perceived injustice and to keep awards
commensurate with the Fund's generous spirit, Feinberg made it
the Fund's unofficial policy to make almost every award at least
$250,000. 155
b. Noneconomic Loss
Noneconomic losses were less controversial. The statute
defined these losses as "losses for physical and emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish,
disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and
153. Id. at 240.
154. See id.
155. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at xx.
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companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic
service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other
nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature."
156
When establishing these awards, Feinberg again created
presumptive guidelines. For these losses, however, he created
presumptive awards for all claimants equally (at least on the death
side) . 158 This approach is similar to a government-benefits
approach to awarding damages-the same for all, regardless of
circumstance.
Claimants could challenge these presumptions based on the
unique circumstances of the individual; however, there was not
much deviation. 15  Under Feinberg's presumptive guidelines,
claimants received $250,000 per victim, with an additional $100,000
award for the victim's surviving spouse and each dependent
child."6° For claimants with injury (non-death) claims, there were
no presumptive guidelines for noneconomic damages because each
victim's injury was deemed unique and therefore decided on a
case-by-case basis.161
The parity of these awards satisfied most. 62 For instance,
firefighters were compensated in the same approximation to
executives earning millions. At the very least, this approach gave
the perception of equality that resonated with 9/11 victims and the
nation.
Many claimants, however, were upset with this approach to
calculating awards. Protests to Feinberg's approach took the form
of two basic complaints. First, some victims thought that they or
156. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, § 402(9), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2006)).
157. See Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 98, at 244.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The basis for the $250,000 figure is the death benefit paid to the
families of public safety officers and military personnel killed in the line of duty.
Id. (citing September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg.
11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002)) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1967 (2003) and 42 U.S.C § 3796
(2003)). "With respect to the $100,000 award per spouse and dependent, the
Final Rule modifies the definition of 'dependent' to include those who fit the
Internal Revenue Service definition of dependent, regardless of whether that
individual was claimed on the victim's most recent federal tax return." Id. at 245.
161. Id. at 244.
162. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 154-55.
163. Id.
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their loved ones had suffered more than others. I 5 For example,
one victim's wife argued, perhaps rightfully so, that she had
suffered great deal more than others on 9/11 because she had
received numerous cell phone calls from her husband detailing the
horrifying events unfolding while he was trapped in one of the
WTC towers. 65 Based on this, the wife argued, she should be
awarded a higher amount than others for pain and suffering. 166
Second, others thought reducing their loved one's suffering to
a formula was an insult to their memory. They were further
enraged that this suffering was equated to "a 'mere' $250,000 per
decedent plus $100,000 per dependent." 67 Many of these victims
blamed "the Special Master for failing to arrive at a figure that
could actually represent the monumental loss they had suffered. ' '6
They argued instead that the standard award should either be
increased or that individual suffering should be calculated as it
would be in the tort system.169
As claims began rolling in, so too did hundreds of the tragic
and amazing stories of the suffering, grief, and heroism that were
arose out of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Analyzing and assigning a
monetary award to these emotional and heart-rending stories
under the limitations imposed by the Fund's mandated quick
turnarounds and cost-effective nature would have opened the door
to countless criticisms. Furthermore, subjective analysis of claims
would have lead to the loved one of a victim asking why the
suffering of her mother or husband should be worth $250,000 less
than someone else's. In the end, no system can be created
perfectly. Ultimately, it appears that Feinberg adequately created a
system that created fair presumptive awards, including set formulas
for suffering, with at least some room for upward deviation based
on compelling circumstances.
164. Id.
165. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 75.
166. Id. According to Feinberg, he received dozens of similar stories regarding
loved ones at the WTC. Id. at 76. This only reaffirmed his initial reaction to
eliminate the highly volatile calculation of individual pain and suffering and
instead rely on presumptive guidelines. Id.
167. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 154-55.
168. Id. at 155. This was despite Feinberg's reasoning that "no amount of
money can right the horrific wrongs done on September 11, 2001." Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 154.
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The most controversial aspect of the Fund was the collateral-
sources offset provision.' 7' Under this statutory provision, awards
were offset by any qualifying collateral sources granted to the
claimant.7 2 As is customary with the statute as a whole, the Fund's
statutory underpinnings were rather vague when discussing
collateral sources. In fact, the statute does not define collateral
sources, but relies instead on a few bare examples: "life insurance,
pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments by Federal,
State, or local governments, related to the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001."' 7
From the start, the Fund's collateral-sources offset provision
was controversial. To begin, the issue of charitable contributions
had to be considered. Initially, Fund awards were going to be offset
by the charitable contributions available to the victims. This raised
the question of whether the government really intended to limit
the awards that the victims of the attacks received because of the
American public's philanthropy. There are few ways to more
inflame the passions of victims, and the public, than by telling them
that the generosity of the American people would be offset when it
came time to compensate the victims. Reacting to the public
outcry, Feinberg eventually eliminated charitable donations, and
social security benefits, from the collateral sources pool. 75 This was
based mostly on the volatile reaction from the public, and in turn
the politicians, to these collateral offsets.
In the end, the two most substantial offsets were life insurance
premiums and pensions.176 This offset, by billions, the amount of
awards paid. 177 It also disproportionately affected those with higher
incomes because they typically purchased the largest policies and
171. Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 98, at 245-46.
172. Id. at 245.
173. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
42, § 402(4), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2006)).
174. Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 98, at 245.
175. Id. at 246.
176. Id. at 247. These offsets were reduced by the amount that the claimants
paid in premiums or contributions to their respective plans, although these
contributions were usually a fraction of the benefit paid. Id.
177. Id.
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had pension programs."' These offsets were also controversial.
Many criticized this portion of the Fund for penalizing those who
planned ahead (or whose employers planned ahead) and were
diligent in their efforts to provide for their families postmortem by
purchasing insurance. "9 Among those whose awards were
substantially offset were the police officers and firefighters who
died on 9/11, due mostly to their pension plans. On the flip side
were those who objected to individuals being overcompensated by
the Fund. For example, family members of victims who were
wealthy and had large life insurance policies would have received a
financial windfall had their awards not been offset by the
multimillion dollar insurance awards. 80 Feinberg made a point of
making every award meaningful. In practice, this unofficial rule
resulted in adding to claims that were wiped out by collateral
offsets.
2. Subrogation
The issue of collateral offsets also relates to the topic of
subrogation. In relation to subrogation and collateral offsets,
Congress had two unique paths from which to choose. One, they
could create a compensation scheme where there were no
collateral offsets in Fund awards but which granted subrogation
rights against the Fund to third parties."' This approach would be
similar to that taken in the tort system. Two, they could create a
compensation scheme in which insurance awards offset Fundr 182
awards and there were no subrogation rights against the Fund.
Essentially, the answer would determine who should bear the loss
for payments made to 9/11 victims: taxpayers or insurance
companies.
In the end, Congress decided to deduct collateral offsets from
the Fund awards and against allowing a subrogation right, thereby
pushing the monetary burden away from the taxpayers.183 There
178. Id.
179. Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral
Sources Under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 591,
599 (2003).
180. Id. These offsets also insulated the Fund from subrogation claims from
insurance companies. The government, however, could have insulated the Fund
through other legislation. Id. at 624.
181. Id. at 601.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 612-13. This differs fundamentally from the approach taken by the
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are several likely reasons for this approach. First, it supports the
contractual obligation that the insurance companies or other third
parties had with the victims. 1 4 Second, it avoided using billions of
taxpayer dollars to provide windfall awards to victims.185  For
example, even if insurance companies or other third parties had a
right of subrogation, they faced very unpromising tort claims
against the airlines, government, and other industries that might
have shared liability. This, essentially, would have resulted in
victims being both fully compensated by the Fund and
compensated by life insurance or pension plans; basically, resulting
in a double payment made at the taxpayer's expense."" Third,
although the U.S. government reserved a subrogation right, in a
practical sense, this was irrelevant. The Fund was created as a
subdivision of ATSSSA, which was promulgated to bailout the
airline industry and other businesses that would have toppled if
liability were attached to them as a result of the terrorist attacks. It
would undermine the main goal behind ATSSSA-protecting
American business and government-if subrogation rights were
allowed.
D. Summary of the 9/11 Fund
The Fund marked a substantial deviation from traditional mass
tort/disaster compensation schemes or settlement funds.
Particularly, the manner and amounts in which the victims were
compensated, the treatment of collateral sources and third parties,
the treatment of the tort alternative, and the near-complete lack of
legislative clarity all clearly distinguish the Fund from the
traditional tort system. By almost all measures, the Fund was a
success. The Fund helped heal a national wound and provided
quick, generous, and efficient means of compensating victims at a
time when the nation needed to respond with patriotic solidarity.
This, of course, makes the Fund a primary source for legislators
who will face unforeseen and unprecedented disasters in the
future. One such occurrence is Minnesota's 1-35W bridge collapse,
which has provided the first, and almost certainly not the last,
Minnesota Legislature in creating the Minnesota Fund. For an in-depth discussion
of the Minnesota Fund's treatment of collateral offsets and third party rights, see
infra Part IV.C.
184. Abraham & Logue, supra note 179, at 613.
185. Id. at 614.
186. Id. at 615.
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testing ground for the Fund's general concepts. An analysis of the
Fund in conjunction with the Minnesota Fund provides a starting
point for similarly situated legislators facing the difficult question
of whether to create a compensation fund in the event of a national
or local tragedy.
IV. THE MINNESOTA FUND
Similar to the 9/11 Fund, Minnesota's compensation scheme
straddles the no-fault and fault worlds. It responds to the urgent
needs of the victims of the collapse by providing compensation
without regard to fault through a process that utilizes a Special
Master Panel to award victims tort damages covering both
economic and non-economic loss.' 87 Because of the incentives to
settle claims against the State through the procedures established
in the compensation scheme, survivors who qualify to recover
under the scheme have little incentive to reject the scheme and sue
the State directly. The State's liability is capped at $400,000 per
person either way, but under the compensation scheme there is no
overall $1 million per occurrence cap on liability for payments
under the scheme, as there would have been had the only recourse
been tort claims against the State, and the survivor may in fact
recover damages in excess of the statutory cap in the form of
supplemental payments to cover excess economic loss under the
scheme.188
The compensation plan in no way avoids potential claims
against third parties, however, who remain subject to suit by the
victims or their representatives. Third parties are also not barred
from seeking contribution from the State, although the
subrogation and reimbursement provisions of the scheme
complicate the process.'"
A. The Scope and Procedural Highlights of the Minnesota Fund
Minnesota's response to the bridge collapse did not fit readily
into any of the State's prior compensation scheme models. Those
schemes cover an array of situations. Minnesota has schemes in
place to handle disaster relief, and it has a department of
187. MINN. STAT. §§ 3.7391-.7395 (2008).
188. Id. § 3.7393 subdiv. 11.
189. Id. §§ 3.7393-.7394.
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homeland security for emergency management.' 9° Minnesota,
190. Minnesota's statutory framework for disaster relief establishes multiple
layers of responsibility and control mechanisms to ensure effective response
efforts. The framework begins with an executive council, consisting of the
governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state auditor and attorney
general, MINN. STAT. § 9.011 subdiv. 1 (2006), which has general authority to take
measures to prevent emergencies and provide relief for stricken communities. Id.
§ 9.061 at subdiv. 1. The executive council also has the power to command any
facilities, offices, or employees of the state to assist in preventing or granting
disaster relief. Id. at subdiv. 2. The council's funds for emergency relief derive
from a legislative appropriation to the council for disaster relief. Id. at subdiv. 5.
The legislature further delegated this power by creating the Minnesota
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) (formerly
known as the Division of Emergency Management), a statewide agency within the
Department of Public Safety. MINN. STAT. § 12.02 subdiv. 1. The HSEM is under
the supervision and control of a state director who oversees all the agency's
directives. Id. § 12.04 subdiv. 1. The agency's main responsibilities include
"coordinat[ing] state agency preparedness for and emergency response to all
types of disasters," MINN. STAT. § 12.09 subdiv. 1 (2006), and "develop[ing] and
maintain[ing] a comprehensive state emergency operations plan and emergency
management program. Id. at subdiv. 2. Responding to this mandate, HSEM
created the Minnesota Incident Management System (MIMS), a formal system
providing guidelines for agency interaction in times of emergency. MINN. DIV. OF
HOMELAND SEC. & EMERGENCY MGMT., MINNESOTA DISASTER MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.dps.state.mn.us/dhsem/
uploadedfile/disman-hand. pdf. MIMS recognizes five functional areas of
response in any pre- or post-emergency situation: (1) command; (2) operations;
(3) planning; (4) logistics; and (5) finance/administration. Id. at 6. The MIMS
also calls for the creation of an emergency operations center (EOC) and an on-
scene commander (OSC). Id. at 11. The EOC is responsible for coordinating and
controlling the overall project as well as the administrative and off-site functions,
while the OSC is responsible for the coordination and control of the specific
activities at the site. Id.
The legislature also requires that every political subdivision in the state
establish a "local organization for emergency management in accordance with the
state emergency management program." MINN. STAT. § 12.25 subdiv. 1. In
practicality, these local organizations handle most emergency situations without
state or federal assistance, because before state or federal resources are used, local
resources must be "exhausted or unavailable and a local state of emergency
declared." MINNESOTA DISASTER MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra, at 31.
However, the governor's power and the possibility of FEMA assistance are
layered on top of these specific HSEM functions. The governor still has the power
to exercise general discretion and control over emergency management, MINN.
STAT. § 12.21 subdiv. 1 (2006), including the ability to oversee rapid emergency
aid, MINN. STAT. § 12.36(a) (1) (2006), and declaring a state of emergency, MINN.
STAT. § 12.31 subdiv. 2(a) (2006). Therefore, HSEM, as a state agency, is
ultimately required to execute and enforce the lawful orders and rules of the
governor. Id. § 12.28. Finally, the state, acting through the governor can apply for
and accept emergency aid gifts from the federal government. Id. § 12.22 subdiv. 1.
If the stricken community has been declared a presidential disaster area, state
assistance may only be available for relief that is not covered by FEMA relief or
other federal funds. Act of Apr. 28, 2008, ch. 247, 2008 Minn. Laws (codified as
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along with other states, has established a system for the
compensation of crime victims.'91 Minnesota adopted workers'
amended at MINN. STAT. § 12.03 (2008)).
The Red River Valley floods of 1997, 2000, and 2001 provide an example
of this coordinated disaster relief effort. In 1997 the City of Ada suffered
devastating floods, causing evacuations, destroying the high school, and damaging
the local hospital. MINN. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, DIv. OF EMERGENCY MGMT.,
MINNESOTA MMGATION SUCCESS STORIES 9-10 (2001), available at
http://www.hsem.state.mn.us/uploadedfile/ successstories.pdf. Following the
floods, FEMA and state disaster assistance provided $40 million to help rebuild the
school and hospital, while state agencies funded the construction of a levee
around Ada to prevent future flood damage. Id. at 10. The Minnesota HSEM also
provided funds to buy portable generators and upgraded city sewer systems to
prevent sewer backup after flooding. Id.; see also MINN. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, DIV.
OF EMERGENCY MGMT., A DECADE OF MINNESOTA DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL LOOK AT
MINNESOTA DISASTERS IN THE 1990S passim (2000) (providing other examples of
Minnesota relief efforts).
191. The Minnesota Legislature has stated that "a victim of a crime has the
right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge or
juvenile delinquency proceeding." MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 subdiv. 1(a). The
Crime Reparations Acti(CRA) addressed this right by creating a special account in
the state treasury, called the crime victim account, which the Department of Public
Safety uses to provide reparations to crime victims. Id. § 611A.612. CRA further
creates a five-member crime reparations board (the "board") within the
Department of Public Safety to disburse the funds. Id. § 611A.55 subdiv. 1. To be
eligible for reparations under CRA, the claimant must be a victim, a dependent of
the victim, the estate of a deceased victim, or another authorized person. Id. §
611A.53 subdiv. 1. However, there may be instances where an otherwise eligible
claimant is not eligible to receive reparations. Id. at subdivs. 1 (a)-2
The board has a variety of duties, including providing hearings for
eligible claimants, adopting rules to implement and administer CRA, and
publicizing the availability of reparations and the method of making claims.
MINN. STAT. § 611A.56 subdiv. 1. The board also has a wide variety of judicial
powers (e.g., issuing subpoenas, ordering medical examinations, and
administering oaths) as well as the power to grant emergency reparations pending
a final decision. Id. at subdiv. 2. However, the board's primary duty is tojudge the
validity of a claim. MINN. STAT. § 61 1A.57. When a claimant seeks reparations the
board may order an investigation, if necessary, to assist in determining the validity
and amount of the claim. Id. at subdiv. 2. The board's executive director has the
authority to make a decision based on the papers filed in support of the claim and
the investigation report. Id. at subdiv. 3. If the executive director is unable to
make a decision based on these sources, he/she then confers with the other
members of the board, who then vote on whether to grant or deny the claim or
seek further investigation. Id. Within thirty days of the decision, the claimant can
appeal for de novo review by the entire board. Id. at subdiv. 5. If the claimant is
again denied, he is entitled to a hearing, within the meaning of the Minnesota
Administrative Procedure Act. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 14.001-69 (describing
the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act).
The amount of the reparations award should equal the economic losses
suffered by the claimant, but cannot exceed $50,000 for the injury or death of one
person. Id. § 61 1A.54. The reparations must also be reduced by contributory fault
and the amount of economic losses that have been recouped from other collateral
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compensation in 1913192 and no-fault automobile insurance in
1975.193
sources. Id.; see also id. § 611A.52 subdiv. 5 (defining "collateral sources"). The
state reserves a subrogation right, to the extent that reparations are awarded, to
the claimant's right to recover economic losses from a collateral source. Id.
§ 611A.61 subdiv. 1. However, this does not limit the claimant's right to bring a
cause of action to recover for other damages. Id.
192. The current version is at MINN. STAT. §§ 176.011-.862. PaulJ. Barringer
et al., Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A Hardy Perennial Blooms Again,
33J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y& L. 725, 742-43 (2008), characterized the reasons for the
adoption of workers' compensation schemes as follows:
[I]n the case of workers' compensation, the main factors were (1)
mutual recognition of dissatisfaction with the existing liability system by
both of the major stakeholder groups in workplace injury policy-
business and labor; (2) the perception on the part of both groups that
shifting to a no-fault system would be advantageous to them in some
important respects; and (3) general agreement over the basic parameters
of the new system, especially the standard for determining eligibility for
damages. In the case of automobile insurance, the primary enabling
factor was, similarly, widespread recognition that a problem existed along
with public demand for change. The predominant factor inhibiting the
adoption and continued utilization of these programs was and has
remained the political compromises necessary to gain passage of no-fault
legislation, which has been a factor in limiting the programs' ability to
deliver promised cost savings. Finally, in the case of vaccine injury
compensation, a wholesale shift to administrative compensation was
spurred by (1) a perceived crisis with important potential health
implications; (2) demands for specific reforms by the two major
stakeholder groups that, although not identical, did not conflict
irreconcilably with one another; (3) the federal government's willingness
to act decisively and accept financial responsibility for the compensation
program; and (4) the program's unusual, cost-spreading financing
scheme, which did not represent an offensive "tax" on any one of the
major players.
In Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry, 735 N.W.2d 713, 725 (Minn. 2007), the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that "Itlhe purpose of the Workers'
Compensation Act as a whole is to 'assure the quick and efficient delivery of
indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to the
employers who are subject to [the Act].' MINN. STAT. § 176.001 (2006)."
193. The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act is at Minnesota
Section sections 65B.41-.71. The stated purposes of the Act are as follows:
[T]he detrimental impact of automobile accidents on uncompensated
injured persons, upon the orderly and efficient administration ofjustice
in this state, and in various other ways requires that sections 65B.41 to
65B.71 be adopted to effect the following purposes:
(1) to relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of
automobile accidents within this state by requiring automobile insurers
to offer and automobile owners to maintain automobile insurance
policies or other pledges of indemnity which will provide prompt
payment of specified basic economic loss benefits to victims of
automobile accidents without regard to whose fault caused the accident;
(2) to prevent the overcompensation of those automobile accident
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There are obvious differences between the workers'
compensation or no-fault acts and the Minnesota Fund. The
bridge-collapse compensation scheme was a response to a specific
disaster, rather than a concern about the general efficacy of the
tort system's ability to deal with a broad class of cases. The bridge-
collapse scheme is financed by the State, rather than privately. The
bridge-collapse compensation scheme provides a tort measure of
damages for victims and subjects the damages to the same $400,000
per person cap that would apply in any litigation against the State.
The available damages include not only special damages but also
general damages, unlike the workers' compensation and no-fault
acts, which provide benefits primarily for economic loss, subject to
various caps and ceilings.
In cases where the State or its political subdivisions bear
potential responsibility for accidents, the primary framework for
compensation is the tort system, with its statutory limitations. The
legislature also boosted the caps on liability under the State Tort
Claims Act when it enacted the compensation scheme. The
amendment increased the caps from $300,000 per person to
$400,000 per person, effective August 2007, although the per
occurrence cap on liability remained at $1 million.
94
Minnesota's statutory immunity for policy-making decisions at
the planning level and official immunity for decisions involving
judgment or discretion at the line level provide additional
insulation from liability. Under Minnesota law, the State has
statutory (discretionary) immunity for policymaking activities at the
planning level, 195 and State officials have common-law (official)
victims suffering minor injuries by restricting the right to recover general
damages to cases of serious injury;
(3) to encourage appropriate medical and rehabilitation treatment of
the automobile accident victim by assuring prompt payment for such
treatment;
(4) to speed the administration ofjustice, to ease the burden of litigation
on the courts of this state, and to create a system of small claims
arbitration to decrease the expense of and to simplify litigation, and to
create a system of mandatory intercompany arbitration to assure a
prompt and proper allocation of the costs of insurance benefits between
motor vehicle insurers;
(5) to correct imbalances and abuses in the operation of the automobile
accident tort liability system, to provide offsets to avoid duplicate
recovery, to require medical examination and disclosure, and to govern
the effect of advance payments prior to final settlement of liability.
194. MINN. STAT. § 3.736 subdiv. 4(b) (2008).
195. Id. at subdiv. 3(b) (the state and its employees are not liable for "a loss
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immunity in cases where they are charged by law with the exercise
of duties involving judgment or discretion. 96 In general, if a state
official has official immunity, the State will have vicarious official
immuniT, In the event the State is held liable, damages are
capped.
Two bills were introduced in the Minnesota Legislature to deal
with the issue of compensation of bridge-collapse victims as an
alternative to the tort system. The House bill, House File 2553,198
passed the House on February 28, 2008 by a vote of 120 to 10. The
primary Senate bill, Senate File 2824, '9 was substituted for House
File 2553, and as amended, passed the Senate unanimously on
March 17, 2008. A conference committee was appointed and the
bill passed the House and Senate on May 5, 2008. The Governor
signed the bill on May 8, 2008.
The House and Senate bills were roughly similar in their
approaches to providing a mechanism for the compensation of the
victims of the bridge collapse, but they differed in the structure for
dealing with catastrophes. The House bill created a shell intended
to deal with extraordinary events that cause widespread
damage, injury, or death, in response to which the
legislature determines that compensation is desirable to
serve the object of government stated in article 1, section
1 of the Minnesota Constitution, to provide for the
security, benefit, and protection of the people.00
The law would have been triggered only "when the legislature
enacts a law appropriating money for purposes of this chapter.
' 20
1
caused by the performance or failure to perform a discretionary duty"). In other
states the immunity is simply termed "discretionary immunity." Minnesota
characterizes it as statutory immunity to separate the concept from official
immunity, which also turns on whether an individual official has exercised
judgment or discretion. See also Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 43 n.1 (Minn.
1996).
196. Johnson, 553 N.W.2d at 46.
197. MINN. STAT. § 3.736 subdivs. 4(a), (c).
198. H.R. 553, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2008), available at
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=ceH2553.1 .html&session
=1s85.
199. S. 2824, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2008), available at
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bil-S2824.0.html&session=ls
85.
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The bill specifically stated that "[t] he legislature finds and declares
that the collapse of the 1-35W bridge on August 1, 2007, constitutes
a catastrophe under Minnesota Statutes, chapter 8A, and that the
state should provide compensation to the survivors of the
catastrophe."
The Senate bill was confined to the 1-35W bridge collapse,
without embracing a general framework for dealing with future
disasters. A motion to amend the findings section in the Senate bill
would have added language stating that "[t] he legislature has every
expectation that this catastrophe will prove unique, and that this
compensation process will not be used for any future event."2 °3 A
second proposed amendment stated that the establishment of a
compensation scheme was "in response to a catastrophe that was
wholly unforeseen. 2 4 Both amendments failed, but neither would
have been of significance. A legislative finding that the bridge
collapse was unforeseen would be the subject of disagreement and
in any event would have to await the outcome of the investigation
into the bridge collapse and any subsequent litigation. The finding
that the catastrophe would prove unique and that the
compensation process would not be used for future events would
have no binding effect on any future legislature.
1. Statement of Purpose
Section 3.7391, subdivision 1, sets out the legislative findings
supporting the act:
[T] he legislature finds that the collapse of the Interstate
Highway 35W bridge over the Mississippi River in
Minneapolis on August 1, 2007, was a catastrophe of
historic proportions. The bridge was the third busiest in
the state, carrying over 140,000 cars per day. Its collapse
killed 13 people and injured more than 100. No other
structure owned by this state had ever fallen with such
devastating physical and psychological impact on so
205
many.
Subdivision 2 states that establishing a compensation process
"for survivors of the catastrophe furthers the public interest by
202. Id. at art. 2, § 1.
203. S. JOURNAL 85, Reg. Sess., at 7327 (Minn. 2008), available at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/j ournals/2007-2008/20080313090.PDF.
204. Id.
205. MINN. STAT. § 3.7391 subdiv. 1 (2008).
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providing a remedy for survivors while avoiding the uncertainty and
expense of potentially complex and protracted litigation to resolve
the issue of the liability of the state, a municipality, or their
employees for damages incurred by survivors." ' 6  The term
"catastrophe" is defined to mean "the collapse of the 1-35W bridge
over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis on August 1, 2007. "207
The conference committee adopted the Senate version, with
208
minor changes. While the compensation bill as enacted does not
provide a specific structure for handling future catastrophes, as did
the House bill, nothing would prevent the basic structure of the
bill, as finally adopted, from being the blueprint for any future
disasters deemed worthy of compensation.
2. Qualifying for the Minnesota Fund
Claims for compensation may be made by "survivors." The
term "survivor" is defined to mean a natural person who was on the
bridge at the time of the collapse, as well as the parent or legal
guardian of a survivor under the age of 18, a survivor's legally
appointed representative, and the surviving spouse or next of kin of
a deceased who would be entitled to bring an action under the
Wrongful Death Act.
The General Information Form, which survivors making claims
to the Special Master Panel are required to complete, tracks the
statute in asking applicants to indicate whether they were "present
on the 1-35 bridge when it collapsed on August 1, 2007," or are
"making a claim on behalf of another person who was present on
the 1-35W bridge when it collapsed ... ,,2'0 A later section in the
form entitled "Standing and Damages," states that "[b]y law, only
certain people are allowed to make a claim for certain kinds of
injuries or damages," and then asks the person to choose one of
206. Id. at subdiv. 2.
207. MINN. STAT. § 3.7392 subdiv. 2.
208. The bill as enacted stated that the findings are not an admission of
liability not only as to the state, but also as to municipalities and their employees
for damages caused by the catastrophe. Id. § 3.7391 subdiv. 3.
209. Id. § 3.7392 subdiv. 8. MINN. STAT. § 573.02 subdiv. 1 (2006) defines the
persons for whose benefit the wrongful death action may be brought, and limits
damages to pecuniary loss.
210. 1-35W Bridge Collapse Survivor Compensation Application, General
Information Form, at 2, http://www.bridgecollapseclaims.com/forms/General
Information.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) [hereinafter General Information
Form].
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four options: (1) the person was "a natural person" who "was
present on the 1-35W Bridge at the time of the collapse"; (2) the
person was "the parent, legal guardian, or guardian ad litem of a
natural person who was present on the 1-35W bridge at the time of
the collapse, and that person is under age 18 as of October 15,
2008"; (3) the person was "the trustee for the next of kin of a
natural person who is now dead, but was living and present on the
1-35W bridge at the time of the collapse"; or (4) the person is
"making a claim, but none of the options above apply.... The
212
person is then asked to explain the reasons justifying the claim.
It is not clear what the other basis for a claim might be if the claim
does not flow from injury or death to someone on the bridge at the
time of the collapse. Bystanders who witnessed the collapse and
suffered emotional trauma would seem to fall outside the scope of213
coverage, as would anyone not on the bridge who might have
sustained economic loss because of the collapse.
The definition of "survivor" in Minnesota's compensation
scheme excludes persons in close family relationships that are not
covered, same-sex or otherwise, in contrast, for example, to the
class of persons who are covered under the Minnesota Civil
Damages Act. This Act permits recovery by "[a] spouse, child,
parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured in person,
property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecuniary loss
by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another person"
against a commercial vendor of alcohol who made an illegal sale of
alcohol that caused the lOSS. 2 14 These sorts of limitations on the
right to recovery raise justice concerns, as noted by Feinberg in
confronting similar problems in administering the 9/11 Fund."'
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. The limitation is consistent with the Minnesota Supreme Court's
adoption of the zone of danger rule in cases involving claims for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress. See Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764,
767 (Minn. 2005).
214. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 subdiv. 1 (2006) (emphasis added). See Lefto v.
Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Minn. 1998) (permitting
recovery by victim's fiancee and her daughter against a bar that illegally sold
alcohol to a person who injured the victim). In negligent infliction of emotional
distress cases involving a claim by a person who was in the zone of danger but
feared for the safety of another, the supreme court limited recovery to persons in a
close relationship but left future cases to determine what close relationships will
justify recovery.
215. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?, supra note 20, at 68-69.
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3. Submitting a Claim
The bill requires the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme
Court to establish a "special master panel" of three attorneys "to
consider claims, make offers of settlement, and enter into
settlement agreements with survivors on behalf of the state. 21 6 The
panel has the authority to establish procedures for making the
claims. Section 3.7393, subdivision 4 of the Act is the only section
specifically labeled as governing procedure. It reads as follows:
[C]onsistent with sections 3.7391 to 3.7395, the panel may
adopt and modify procedures, rules, and forms for
considering claims, making offers of settlement, entering
into settlement agreements, and considering requests for
and making supplemental payments. The panel must
allow each survivor to appear in person before the panel
or one of its members.
The Special Master Panel consulted with several people in
developing the claims process, including "several lawyers
representing survivors, representatives of the Minnesota Attorney
General's office, State Court Administration, and Minnesota
Department of Finance, and authors of the legislation, Senator Ron
Latz (DFL-St. Louis Park) and Representative Ryan Winkler (DFL-
Golden Valley) .,,2s
The "Overview of the Special Compensation Process for
Survivors of the 1-35W Bridge Collapse" (Overview) posted on the
web site for the compensation process states the following:
[A]fter an Application is submitted, each survivor will be
216. MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 1 (2008). The panel members, all highly
respected and experienced Minnesota attorneys, are Susan Holden (chair),
Michael Tewksbury, and Steven Kirsch. Barbara L. Jones, 35W Bridge Survivors'
Fund Ready to Take Claims, MINN. LAW., Aug. 11, 2008, at 1, 13, available at
http://www.minnlawyer.com/article.cfm/2008/08/11/35W-Bridge-survivors-fund-
ready-to-take-claims.
217. MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 4.
218. Susan M. Holden, Chair, Special Master Panel, Special Compensation
Process for Survivors of the 1-35W Bridge Collapse (July 28, 2008),
http://www.bridgecollapseclaims.com/index.php. Section 3.7393, subdivision 2
provides for staffing of the process:
[W]ithin the limits of available appropriations, the state court
administrator, in consultation with the panel, shall hire employees or
retain consultants necessary to assist the panel in performing its duties
under this section. Employees are in the unclassified state civil service.
The panel may also use consultants who are under a contract with the
state or current state employees to assist the panel in processing claims
under this section.
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scheduled to meet with a member of the Special Master
Panel. Survivors are encouraged to exercise their right in
this process to meet personally with a member of the
Special Master Panel or the Panel. Any survivor who does
not wish to meet with a Special Master may waive the in-
person meeting by indicating in the survivor's Application
their desire to submit their claim in written form only.
Any survivor who wishes to meet with the full Panel of
three Special Masters may also indicate that desire in the
survivor's Application.
The "General Information Form" permits claimants to have
their claims presented "in a hearing with one Special Master" or
"in a hearing with all three Special Masters. 220 Claimants may also
choose to submit their claims based solely on the written
application. 22' Hearings will be scheduled for thirty minutes, unless
claimants request a time of forty-five or sixty minutes, or a longer
time, although that requires a written explanation. 
22
A panel determination concerning an offer of settlement or a
supplemental payment "is final and not subject to judicial• ,,223
review. In that respect, the compensation scheme is similar to
the 9/11 Fund, although to establish fairness and openness in the
administration of the 9/11 Fund administrative regulations
provided for an administrative appeal from the determinations of
224the special master.
The Overview qualifies the statutory statement with respect to
wrongful death claims:
[T]he settlement and disbursement of certain claims
involving injury to minors or claims for wrongful death
must be court approved in accordance with the General
Rules of Practice for the District Courts (Rule 144 for a
death claim and Rule 145 for a claim on behalf of a
minor). The court approval must be completed within
the 45 day time period prescribed for acceptance of
claims. A copy of the signed court order approving the
settlement disbursement must be returned to the Special
219. Overview of the Special Compensation Process for Survivors of the 1-35W
Bridge Collapse, http://www.bridgecollapseclaims.com/overview.php (last visited
Jan. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Overview].
220. General Information Form, supra note 210, at 5.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 8(b) (2008).
224. Feinberg, Building Blocks, supra note 66, at 275.
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Master Panel along with the survivor's signed Release
form.
In order to speed the administration of these claims
during the limited 45 day acceptance period, petitions for
settlement approval filed in Ramsey or Hennepin
Counties will not require payment of a filing fee. In
addition, all of the settlement matters filed in Hennepin
and Ramsey Counties will be promptly scheduled for
hearing before a judge within the limited 45 day
acceptance period. Each claimant to whom this applies
will receive specific court filing instructions with their
offer of settlement.225
The Overview also encourages survivors to consult with
attorneys:
[S]urvivors are encouraged to consult an attorney who
will represent the survivor throughout the special
compensation process, although having a lawyer is not
required. Survivors are encouraged to consult with an
attorney about the nature of their damages which may be
claimed in this process and the best means of effectively
225. Overview, supra note 219. Minnesota General Rules of Practice 144.01,
covering wrongful death claims, provides as follows:
[E]very application for the appointment of a trustee of a claim for death
by wrongful act under Minnesota Statutes, section 573.02, shall be made
by the verified petition of the surviving spouse or one of the next of kin
of the decedent. The petition shall show the dates and places of the
decedent's birth and death; the decedent's address at the time of death;
the name, age and address of the decedent's surviving spouse, children,
parents, grandparents, and siblings; and the name, age, occupation and
address of the proposed trustee. The petition shall also show whether or
not any previous application has been made, the facts with reference
thereto and its disposition shall also be stated. The written consent of
the proposed trustee to act as such shall be endorsed on or filed with
such petition. The application for appointment shall not be considered
filing of a paper in the case for the purpose of any requirement for filing
a certificate of representation or informational statement.
Rule 145.01, which covers claims on behalf of minors, provides that:
No part of the proceeds of any action or claim for personal injuries on
behalf of any minor or incompetent person shall be paid to any person
except under written petition to the court and written order of the court
as hereinafter provided. This rule governs a claim or action brought by a
parent of a minor, by a guardian ad litem or general guardian of a minor
or incompetent person, or by the guardian of a dependent, neglected or
delinquent child, and applies whether the proceeds of the claim or
action have become fixed in amount by a settlement agreement, jury
verdict or court findings, and even though the proceeds have been
reduced to judgment.
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documenting those damages. In addition, certain aspects
of settlements involving minors or claims related to death
must be court approved and, thus, having legal
representation is encouraged. There are attorneys
available to represent survivors at no fee for their services
in this special compensation process.6
The Overview provides a list of the law firms known to be
representing survivors or claimants in connection with the bridge
collapse.227
Survivors were required to file claims with the panel by
October 15, 2008.228 The panel must make an offer of settlement
by February 28, 2009. 2 1 Survivors then have forty-five days to
accept or reject the offer.
4. Causation
The legislation requires a computation of damages, but in
defining the damages that are recoverable through settlements
under the plan there is no requirement that the damages arise out
of the collapse, which is the compensable event the plan intends to
address. Only survivors are eligible to recover under the plan,
however, and survivors are defined as those who were on the 1-35W
bridge at the time of the collapse, so it is logical to assume a
requirement that the damages must have arisen out of the collapse.
The General Information Form that the Special Master Panel
drafted fills in that blank by asking applicants to indicate whether
they "sustained damages due to a DEATH caused by the 1-35W
bridge collapse," "sustained PERSONAL INJURIES as a result of
being on the 1-35W bridge at the time of the collapse," or
"sustained damage to PROPERTY as a result of being on the 1-35W
bridge at the time of the collapse. 231
5. Financing the Minnesota Fund
The House bill provided for the appropriation of $39.32
million from the general fund for deposit in the catastrophe
226. Overview, supra note 219.
227. Id.
228. MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 9 (2008).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. General Information Form, supra note 210, at 2.
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S 232survivor compensation fund. It limited appropriations for
purposes other than payment to survivors to 1% of the• 9 33
appropriation.23 The bill also appropriated $680,000 for a grant to
Pillsbury United Communities in Minneapolis, to allow Waite
House in Minneapolis to provide comprehensive services to youth
and families of youth who were on a school bus on the 1-35W
234bridge when it collapsed .
The Senate bill, Senate File 2824, took a somewhat different
approach to the compensation issue. It provided for increasing the
caps in the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act to $400,000 for injury
to any claimant in any case arising on or after August 1, 2007, and
before July 1, 2009, and $1 million for any number of claims arising
235out of a single occurrence .
Article 1 of the Senate bill would have retroactively increased
the $300,000 cap on individual tort claims against the State to
236
$400,000, effective August 1, 2007 6. Rather, this increase took
effect on January 1, 2008.237 The change would apply to claims
brought by bridge-collapse victims as well as any other person who
has a claim against the State.
The Senate bill provided for the appropriation of $26.43
million, including $25 million for settlement agreements, but with
the caveat that the intent is "to fully fund the settlement
agreements," and that if the amount appropriated is insufficient to
do so, the Commissioner of Finance is directed to notify the
legislature of the projected insufficiency.2 38 The bill specifically
appropriated $750,000 from the general fund to cover the salaries
and expenses associated with the settlement fund process, 2' 9 and
$680,000 from the general fund for a grant to Pillsbury United
Communities in Minneapolis to permit Waite House "to provide
comprehensive services to youth and families of youth who were on




234. Id. at subdiv. 2.





238. See id. at art. 2, § 3(a).
239. Seeid. § 3(b).
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i1 1240
a school bus on the 1-35W bridge" when it collapsed.
As enacted, the compensation scheme is an amalgam of both
approaches. It is financed by a $40 million appropriation from the
general fund to the Commissioner of Finance. The appropriation
is broken into four parts. The bill appropriates $24 million for
payments under settlement agreements pursuant to section 3.3793,
subdivision 11; $12.64 million for supplemental payments under
subdivision 12; $750,000 for salaries, expenses, and administrative
costs associated with making settlement offers and entering into
settlement agreements; and $610,000 "for a grant to Pillsbury
United Communities in Minneapolis, to allow Waite House in
Minneapolis to provide services to youth and families of youth who
were on a school bus on the 1-35W bridge when the bridge
collapsed. , 24' The bill does not contain the Senate provision for
additional appropriations if necessary, although that would not be
an impediment to any bill providing for additional funding. The
bill also included a specific appropriation for supplemental




Both the House and Senate bills defined the compensation
survivors would be entitled to recover in terms of tort damages,
reduced by certain collateral sources and payments made by third-
party tortfeasors.
The House bill provided that the special master would
"determine the loss suffered by the survivor filing a claim."
24 2
"Loss" was defined to mean "economic loss" and "noneconomic-- 243
loss" resulting from a catastrophe. Economic loss was defined as
"pecuniary harm resulting from a catastrophe, and includes loss of
earnings, medical expenses, burial costs, property loss, and loss of
business or employment opportunity.",2" Noneconomic loss was
240. See id. § 3(c).
241. See generally MINN. STAT. § 3.7394 subdiv. 6.
242. H.R. 2553, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess., at art. 1, § 3 subdiv. 3(a) (Minn. 2008),
available at https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=ceH2553.1.
html&session=1s85.
243. Id. § 2 subdiv. 5.
244. Id. at subdiv. 3.
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defined as "nonpecuniary harm resulting from a catastrophe, and
includes loss for physical and emotional pain and suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish,
disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of society and
companionship. 245  The House bill did not limit the amount of
damages to be awarded to a survivor.
The House bill provided that in determining loss the special
master would be required to "offset payments made or to be made
in the future from sources as defined in section 548.36, subdivision
1, that compensate a survivor for loss or losses as a result of the
catastrophe. 2 4 ' The bill also provided that the special master was
required to offset "any payments made or to be made by a third-
party tortfeasor pursuant to a settlement or other agreement with
the survivor, or a judgment in favor of the survivor, concerning any
claim or claims of the survivor which relate to, involve, or arise out
of the catastrophe.
2 47
The Senate bill defined "damages" to mean "damages that are
compensable under state tort law and damages that are included
for wrongful death that are compensable under Minnesota
Statutes, section 573.02." The definition excluded "punitive
damages or attorney fees or other fees incurred by a victim in
making a claim under this section or other law. ,248 The bill
provided for the total damages incurred by the victim to be offset
by the collateral source reductions mandated by section 548.36,
"any payment to the victim from the emergency relief fund," and
"any payments made or required to be made to the victim by a
third-party tortfeasor under the terms of an existing settlement or
other agreement with the victim or a final judgment in favor of the
victim concerning claims of the victim that relate to, involve, or
arise out of the bridge collapse. 249  Thus, the Senate bill was
broader in also providing for reductions by payments received from
victims from the emergency relief fund.
The primary difference between the House and Senate bills is
that the House bill provided for the reduction of payments under
the fund by amounts paid or to be paid in the future, both under
245. Id. at subdiv. 6.
246. Id. § 3 subdiv. 5(a).
247. Id.
248. S. 2824, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess., at art. 2, § 1 subdiv. 2(a) (Minn. 2008),
available at https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S2824.0.
html&session=1s85.
249. Id. at subdivs. 4 (a)-(c).
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the collateral source statute and pursuant to a settlement
agreement or judgment against a third-party tortfeasor. Making
the determination of future losses, coming as they likely would a
substantial period of time after the settlement of any claims under
the compensation scheme, would present significant administrative
difficulties. The Senate bill addressed the problem by providing
for subrogation or reimbursement in cases involving claims by
victims against third-party tortfeasors.2 50 As enacted, the bill
251
adopted the Senate position on compensation.
The statute as enacted follows the Senate version in requiring
the Special Master Panel to determine the total damages incurred
by survivors. It defines "damages" as "damages that are
compensable under state tort law and damages for wrongful death
that are compensable under section 573.02," the Wrongful Death
Act. 25 3 Punitive damages and attorney fees or other fees incurred in
254
making a claim are not included in the definition.
Tort damages include past and future damages for bodily and
mental harm, health care expenses, and income loss, including loss
of earning capacity.255 A non-injured spouse may make a claim for
256loss of consortium caused by injury to his or her spouse. The
claim for consortium is for loss of the injured spouse's services and
companionship the non-injured spouse would have received in the
251usual course of married life. Minnesota law does not permitS 258
children to recover for loss of parental consortium nor does it
permit parents to recover for loss of the consortium of their
children 259
The compensation scheme defines "survivor" as "a natural
person who was present on the 1-35W bridge at the time of the
collapse," as well as parents or legal guardians of survivors under
the age of eighteen, the legally appointed representative of a
survivor, or the surviving spouse or next of kin who would be
250. See id. § 2 subdiv. 5(b).
251. MINN. STAT. § 3.7394 subdiv. 3 (2008).
252. Id. § 3.7392 subdiv. 3.
253. See MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2006).
254. See MINN. STAT. § 3.7392 subdiv. 3 (2008).
255. For a convenient summary, see 4A Minnesota Practice: Jury Instruction
Guides-Civil, CIVJIG 91.10-.35 (5th ed. 2006).
256. Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 512-13, 170 N.W.2d 865,
869 (1969).
257. Id. at 510-11; Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d at 867-68.
258. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1982).
259. Father A v. Moran, 469 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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entitled to bring a wrongful death action.2 ° It says nothing about
consortium claims, although those claims are derivative in nature
and flow from personal injury of a spouse. The Personal Injury
Form adopted by the Special Master Panel asks whether the person
making the claim was married as of the date of the bridge collapse
and, if the answer is yes, asks the claimant whether "you [are]
including in your individual claim your spouse's loss of
consortium. 2 6 ' A "checklist of documents for personal injury
claims" at the end of the form specifically states "If you are making
a claim for spouse's loss of consortium, please attach all supporting
documentation and a notarized statement signed by your spouse
describing that loss.3
262
An interesting question arises under the compensation scheme
concerning the right of survivors to recover for emotional harm.
Emotional harm flowing from personal injury is compensable, of263
course. One who does not suffer emotional harm as a direct
result of physical injury but is nonetheless in the zone of danger is
also permitted to recover damages for emotional harm in
264Minnesota under limited circumstances. Survivors making claims
under the compensation scheme may or may not be in that
position, although many of the people on the bridge at the time of
the collapse undoubtedly would have suffered emotional trauma in
260. MINN. STAT. § 3.7392 subdiv. 8 (2008).
261. 1-35W Bridge Collapse Survivor Compensation Application, Personal
Injury Form, at 2, http://bridgecollapseclaims.com/forms/PersonalInjury.pdf
(last visitedJan. 4, 2009).
262. Id. at 12.
263. See e.g., Krueger v. Henschke, 210 Minn. 307, 309, 298 N.W. 44, 45 (1941).
264. See Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 2005). A
plaintiff making a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress must, in
addition to establishing the elements of negligence, prove that "she: (1) was
within the zone of danger of physical impact [created by the defendant's
negligence]; (2) reasonably feared for her own safety; and (3) [consequently]
suffered severe emotional distress with attendant physical manifestations." Id.
(quoting K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995)). Engler held that a
plaintiff could recover for emotional distress resulting from injuries to a third
party when she:
(1) was in the zone of danger of physical impact; (2) had an objectively
reasonable fear for her own safety; (3) had severe emotional distress with
attendant physical manifestations; and (4) stands in a close relationship
to the third-party victim. In addition, to succeed with such a claim, the
plaintiff also must establish that the defendant's negligent conduct-the
conduct that created an unreasonable risk of physical injury to the
plaintiff-caused serious bodily injury to the third-party victim.
706 N.W.2d at 770-71.
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part because of their concern for other victims. Section 3.7393,
subdivision 7 of the compensation scheme states that "[t]he panel
must not consider negligence or any other theory of liability" in
considering claims and making offers of settlement.265  The
problem is that the right to recover for emotional distress in cases
involving recovery by persons in the zone of danger, whether or not
they fear for the safety of others, is tied to the negligence claim.
Putting aside the issue of fault, a claimant would still presumably
have to meet the zone of danger standards in order to claim
damages for emotional distress.
2. Supplemental Payments
Survivors may also be eligible for supplemental payments to
cover medical expenses, income loss, loss of future earning
capacity, or other financial support for which compensation was
not received under an offer of settlement pursuant to subdivision
11 of section 3.3793. Supplemental payments may be made only to
a survivor who has accepted a settlement offer, entered into a
settlement agreement, and executed the required release. 26r
The bill provides a priority of payments scheme for
supplemental benefits. It provides coverage first for
uncompensated medical expenses in excess of those expenses paid
from the first $400,000, and second, for income loss, loss of future
earning capacity, or other financial support not included in the
first $400,000. 21 7  The bill defines "uncompensated medical
expenses" to mean "medical expenses less payments made to a
survivor from collateral sources" referred to in the collateral source
statute that provide payment for medical expenses and "the present
value of premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance payments for
high-risk health plan coverage offered by the Minnesota
Comprehensive Health Association.268
If the legislative appropriation is insufficient to provide full
awards to all survivors who are eligible for supplemental payments,
265. MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 7 (2008).
266. Id. atsubdiv. 12(b).
267. Id.
268. Id. at subdiv. 12(a). The Minnesota Legislature provided for the
establishment of the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Association (MCHA) in
1976 to offer individual health insurance policies to Minnesota residents who were
denied health insurance in the private market because of pre-existing health
conditions. See MCHA's Home Page, http://www.mchamn.com/ (last visited Jan.
4, 2009).
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the panel may make payment awards based on a uniform amount
that is less than the full amount available for supplemental
payments, or take other steps to ensure that there is an equitable
distribution of the available funds. 69
C. Third-Party Matters
1. Impact of Acceptance of Settlement Offer
The scheme provides that any survivor accepting a settlement
offer must execute a release. There are three parts to the release
subdivision. The first part requires the survivor "to release the state
and every municipality of this state and their employees from
liability, including claims for damages, arising from the catastrophe
and to cooperate with the state in pursuing claims the state may
have against any other party.,
270
The second part covers the right of the State and its
municipalities and their employees to indemnification from
liability for contribution or indemnity:
[T]he release must... provide that the survivor will
indemnify the state, a municipality, and their employees
from any claim of contribution or indemnity, or both,
made by other persons against the state, a municipality,
and their employees and that the survivor will satisfy any
judgment obtained by the survivor in an action against
other persons to the extent of the release, if the claim or
judgment relates in any way to a claim of the survivor
arising from the catastrophe. The release must provide
for the subrogation interest of the state under section
2713.7394, subdivision 5.
The third part provides that a survivor who has previously
commenced an administrative, court, or other action against the
State or a municipality or their employees seeking to recover for
loss that resulted from the catastrophe "must agree to dismiss or
otherwise withdraw the action" before the survivor will be entitled
272to receive compensation.
269. MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 12(c).
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2. Settlement Offers and the Interests of the State and Third Parties
The statute protects the State's interest in being reimbursed
for payments under the fund in three ways. First, the release the
survivor is required to sign in accepting the settlement offer not
only releases the State, its municipalities, and their employees from
liability, but it also provides for a right of indemnity against the
survivor for any contribution or indemnity claims against the State
by third parties who assert contribution or indemnity claims against
the State. Second, the State reserves a right to be reimbursed for
any payments pursuant to the plan or the emergency relief fund
from "any third party, including an agent, contractor, or vendor...
to the extent the third party caused or contributed to the
catastrophe.,,17' Third, the State is subrogated to claims the
survivor has against third parties, but only to the extent that the
payments under the fund are greater than the total damages
sustained by the survivor. 274 This part discusses the State's rights
under the statute and then uses a hypothetical to examine how the
rights relate to each other and how they affect the rights of the
survivor and a defendant subject to liability for the bridge collapse.
a. The State's Right to Indemnification from the Survivor
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the release form drafted by the Special
Panel Master spells out how the statutory requirement will be
implemented:
5. [C]laimant hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and
save the State Releasees harmless from liability for any
claims, demands, causes of action or judgments for
contribution or indemnity on or under any theory of
liability, whether sounding in tort, contract, federal or
state statute, if the claim, demand, cause of action or
judgment relates in any way to a claim of the Claimant
arising out of or relating to the Collapse.
6. It is also agreed and understood that Claimant releases
and further agrees to indemnify, defend and save the
State Releasees harmless from liability for any and all
claims, demands, causes of action or judgments based on
any subsequent judgment of Claimant in any way arising
out of or relating to the Collapse being determined to be
273. MINN. STAT. § 3.7394 subdiv. 5(a).
274. Id. at subdiv. 5(c).
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uncollectible in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 604.02 as
275may be reallocated to any of the State Releasees.
The release requires the settling survivor to indemnify the
State releasees from any liability sustained by the State via
contribution or indemnity claims, no matter what the theory of
liability is, as well as from any liability pursuant to the loss
276reallocation provisions of section 604.02.
The release effectively operates as would an indemnity clause• 277
in a Pierringer release, but with one significant difference. A
Pierringer release severs joint and several liability between the
settling and nonsettling parties, so that the nonsettling parties are
subject to liability only for the percentage of fault assigned to them
in subsequent litigation.278 The nonsettling party, held liable only
for its percentage of the total damages, has no basis for asserting a
contribution claim against the settling defendant.
279
More significantly, the 2003 amendment of the comparative
fault act abolished joint and several liability in favor of several
liability, except when a defendant is determined to be more than
50% at fault or where two or more actors engaged in a common.. .280
scheme or plan that resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The only
way the reallocation provision in section 604.02, subdivision 2 of
the comparative fault act could apply to make the State subject to
liability on a contribution claim by a third party is if the party is
held liable for more than its fair share of thejudgment. That could
happen only if the third party were jointly and severally liable for
275. Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims, at 3, available at
http://bridgecollapseclaims.com/forms/ReleaseLumpSumSample.pdf (last
visitedJan. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Release Form].
276. Id.
277. The Minnesota Supreme Court sanctioned the use of Pierringer releases in
Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978). See generally Peter B. Knapp,
Keeping the Pierringer Promise: Fair Settlements and Fair Trials, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the development, advantages, and disadvantages of
Pierringer releases);John E. Simonett, Release ofJoint Tortfeasors: Use of the Pierringer
Release in Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1 (1977) (discussing the early
development and use of the Pierringer release in Minnesota, along with its
limitations and procedural and tactical considerations).
278. See Simonett, supra note 277, at 11.
279. See id. at 19-22.
280. MINN. STAT. § 604.02 subdivs. 1 (1)-(2) (2006). Joint and several liability
also applies where a defendant has committed an intentional tort or where certain
environmental liability statutes apply. Id. at subdivs. 1(3)-(4). Neither would be
applicable in the bridge collapse case.
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the survivor's damages.28 ' A defendant responsible for the bridge
collapse would therefore have a contribution claim against the
State only where that defendant is more than 50% at fault or if that
282
defendant and the State acted in a common scheme or plan.
Conversely, the State should not have a common law contribution
claim against the defendant because the State is not subject to tort
liability against a settling survivor because in accepting the
settlement the survivor waives any claims against the State.
b. Reimbursement from Agent, Contractor, or Vendor
Section 3.7394, subdivision 5(a) covers the State's right of
reimbursement for payments made under the fund. The right of
reimbursement exists against various third parties, including
agents, contractors, or vendors retained by the State, for any
payments paid by the State pursuant to the compensation scheme
or the emergency relief fund. The reimbursement right exists "to
the extent the third party caused or contributed to the
catastrophe.,,18' The statute also provides that the State "is entitled
to be reimbursed regardless of whether the survivor is fully
compensated" and that the right of reimbursement exists
"[n] otwithstanding any statutory or common law to the contrary."
284
Paragraph 11 of the release form drafted by the Special Master
Panel covers the State's right to be reimbursed by the third party.
It reads as follows:
[T]he parties understand and agree that, in accordance
with Minn. Stat. § 3.7394, subd. 5, this Agreement is not
intended to, and does not, negate or diminish any right
the State may have to recover reimbursement of the
Payment, and/or any payment made to Claimant from the
1-35W bridge emergency relief fund created by the State
on or about November 30, 2007, from any third party,
including but not limited to an agent, contractor or
vendor retained by the State. The State is entitled to
reimbursement by a third party regardless of whether
Claimant is fully compensated. Claimant agrees to
281. See Michael K. Steenson, Joint and Several Liability in Minnesota: The 2003
Model, 30 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 845, 858-59 (2004).
282. See id. at 862-64.
283. MINN. STAT. § 3.7394subdiv. 5(a) (2008).
284. Id.
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cooperate with the State in the State's pursuit of any
claims the State may have against any third party for
reimbursement or otherwise, including subrogation as
provided in Paragraph 12.285
The right of reimbursement exists irrespective of whether the
survivor brings suit against a third party, although agents, vendors,
and contractors are of course the entities against whom suit has
been and will be brought by survivors. The subdivision 5(a) right
of reimbursement appears to be independent of the right of
reimbursement noted in the subrogation in subdivision 5 (c), which
is connected to the State's right of subrogation. The right of
reimbursement exists "to the extent the third party caused or
contributed to the catastrophe. ,2 86 This language seems to hint at a
right of reimbursement conditioned on the apportionment of
responsibility.
c. State's Right to Subrogation
Section 3.7394, subdivisions 5 (b) and (c) cover the State's
subrogation rights:
(b) [N]otwithstanding any statutory or common law to the
contrary, the state is subrogated to all potential claims
against third-party tortfeasors of a survivor receiving
payment from the emergency relief fund or under section
3.7393 to the extent the claims relate to, involve, or arise
out of the catastrophe. The subrogation right of the state
under this subdivision is limited to the amount paid to the
survivor from the emergency relief fund and under
section 3.7393. The rights of the state under this
subdivision are in addition to other remedies, claims, and
rights relating to the catastrophe that the state may have
against other persons for the recovery of monetary or
other relief.
(c) A survivor must notify the state if the survivor has been
fully compensated by third parties for damages caused by
the catastrophe. A survivor is fully compensated if
payments made or required to be made to the survivor by
a third-party tortfeasor under the terms of a settlement
agreement or other agreement with the survivor or a final
judgment in favor of the survivor concerning claims that
285. Release Form, supra note 275, at 5.
286. MINN. STAT. § 3.7394subdiv. 5(a).
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relate to, involve, or arise out of the catastrophe are equal
to or greater than the total damages incurred by the
survivor as determined by the panel under section 3.7393,
subdivision 10. The state is entitled to be reimbursed by a
survivor only to the extent that these payments are greater
than the total damages incurred by the survivor.187
The right of subrogation is specifically stated to be in addition
to other rights that "the state may have against other persons for
the recovery of monetary or other relief.1 8 It subrogates the State
"to all potential claims against third-party tortfeasors of a survivor
receiving payment from the emergency relief fund or under section
3.7393 to the extent the claims relate to, involve, or arise out of the
catastrophe. 289 The subrogation right is limited to the amounts
paid by the State pursuant to the compensation scheme and from
the emergency relief fund.
Paragraph 12 of the release form interprets the statute as
follows:
[C]laimant understands and agrees that, in accordance
with Minn. Stat. §§ 3.7393, subd. 13 and 3.7394, subd. 5,
the State is subrogated to all potential claims that
Claimant has or may have against any other person or
entity that in any way arise out of or relate to the Collapse.
Claimant and the State agree that the State's right to
subrogation herein is limited to the total amount of the
Payment and any payment made to Claimant from the I-
35W bridge emergency relief fund created by the State on
or about November 30, 2007. Claimant shall not take any
action, including settlement with any other person or
entity, that adversely affects the State's subrogation or
reimbursement rights. Claimant further agrees, in
accordance with Minn. Stat. § 3.7394, subd. 5(c), to notify
the State in the event Claimant becomes fully
compensated for Claimant's losses arising out of or
related to the Collapse. The rights of the State under this
Agreement are in addition to other remedies, claims, and
rights relating to the Collapse that the State may have
against other persons for the recovery of monetary or
other relief.
29 0
Subdivision 5(c) requires a survivor to notify the State if the
287. Id. atsubdivs. 5(b)-(c).
288. Id. atsubdiv. 5(b).
289. Id.
290. Release Form, supra note 275, at 5-6.
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survivor receives full compensation from a third-party tortfeasor for
"claims that relate to, involve, or arise out of the catastrophe. 291
Full compensation is achieved if the terms of a settlement or other
agreement between a survivor by a third-party tortfeasor or the
terms of a final judgment in favor of the survivor against a third-
party tortfeasor, "are equal to or greater than the total damages
incurred by the survivor" as determined by the Special Master
292Panel. The State has a right to be reimbursed only to the extent
that the payments from a third-party tortfeasor "are greater than
the total damages incurred by the survivor.
2 9
1
The last sentence of subsection (c) refers to the State's right to
be reimbursed, permitting reimbursement only where the
payments from a third-party tortfeasor are greater than the
survivor's total damages as determined by the Special Master Panel.
The relationship of subsection (c) to subsection (a) is not entirely
clear. Subsection (a) states that the State has a right to
reimbursement from "any third party, including an agent,
contractor, or vendor retained by the state... regardless of
whether the survivor is fully compensated. 294  It seems to be in
opposition to the right of reimbursement noted in subsection (c),
which is limited to cases where the survivor is fully compensated.
The limitation of the subrogation right is consistent with the way
subrogation rights have generally been read by the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
2 95
The right of reimbursement noted in subsection (a) is granted
to the State against the "agent, contractor or vendor retained by
the state," and is not the sort of reimbursement noted in subsection
(c), which would be a right of reimbursement that is consistent
with the right of subrogation and would exist only to the extent
291. MINN. STAT. § 3.7394 subdiv. 5(c).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. atsubdiv. 5(a).
295. In the insurance context, subrogation involves the substitution of an
insurer to the insured's rights against a third party. "The insurer stands in the
insured's shoes and acquires the insured's rights against the third party." Medica,
Inc. v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 1997). The general rule is that
subrogation, whether equitable or based on contract, will be denied prior to full
recovery by the claimant. Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn.
1983). Put another way, subrogation is not allowed where the insured's total
recovery is less than the insured's actual loss, absent express contract terms to the
contrary. Id.
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that a subrogation claim would exist against the third party.296 If so,
it makes sense to consider the right of reimbursement in
subsection (a) as distinct from that in subsection (c). The right of
reimbursement in subsection (a) exists no matter what amounts
the survivor has been paid from the compensation fund or the
emergency relief fund. The survivor need not be fully
compensated in order for the State to be entitled to obtain
297reimbursement from the third party. In effect, to use the
insurance analogy, the right of reimbursement is contractual and
may be exercised against the third party irrespective of whether or
not the survivor makes a claim against that party.
The rights of subrogation and reimbursement noted in
subsections (b) and (c) are more like the classical subrogation
claims exercised by an insurer standing in the shoes of the insured.
Equitable principles limit that subrogation right to the amounts
paid by the insured and permit the right to be exercised only to the
extent necessary to prevent a double recovery. One problem in
interpretation concerns the fact that the categories of third parties
referred to in subsections (a) and (c) may overlap.
d. The Rights in Combination
To better understand how the State's interests play out, this
section uses a hypothetical to illustrate some of the potential
complications of the statutory provisions governing reimbursement
and subrogation. For purposes of illustration, assume that a
Survivor receives a settlement from the Panel in the amount of
$400,000 and then brings suit for negligence against a third-party
contractor, and that the judgment against the contractor is for $1
million. For simplicity, assume that the Panel also determined that
the Survivor's total damages were $1 million. Also assume that the
contractor is found to be 60% at fault and the State 40% at fault.
The Survivor is entitled to collect $1 million from the contractor.
The statute precludes the contractor from reducing its obligation
by the settlement received from the Panel. The contractor, 60% at
fault, has a contribution against the State in the amount of the
overpayment. The contractor's fair share of the judgment is
$600,000, so the contractor has a contribution claim against the
State for $400,000.
296. MINN. STAT. § 3.7394 subdiv. 5(a).
297. Id.
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The State, however, has a subrogation claim against the
contractor to the extent of the amount of the payment received by
the Survivor from the Panel. The State would be entitled to
recover $400,000 by way of reimbursement from the Survivor, who
is nonetheless made whole because she has received total
compensation of $1 million, which is the exact amount of the
damages she sustained. The contractor, however, still has a
contribution claim against the State. If the State satisfies the
contribution claim, the statute gives the State a right of
indemnification from the Survivor to the extent of the contribution
claim.
That would mean that the Survivor would have to pay the State
$400,000 out of the remaining $600,000 the Survivor received after
the State exercised its subrogation right. If so, the net effect is that
the Survivor's total payment for her injuries would be $600,000.
She would be undercompensated. The State, found to be 40% at
fault, effectively pays nothing. Because the State has recovered the
payment made by the Panel by exercising its right of subrogation, it
presumably would not in addition be entitled to a statutory right of
reimbursement for the same amount.
It is questionable whether the Legislature would have intended
to undercompensate the Survivor. A more logical reading would
be to permit the contribution claim by the contractor, require
indemnification of the State by the Survivor, and then deny the
State its subrogation right because exercising that right would
result in undercompensation of the Survivor.
Or, in the reverse, the State could assert its right of
reimbursement first and recover from the contractor "to the
extent" the contractor "caused or contributed to the catastrophe."
But what if the Survivor later brings suit? If the State recouped the
$400,000 from the contractor and the Survivor subsequently
recovers in the same amount, i.e., $1 million, the State would still
be subject to liability on the contribution claim. If the State paid
$400,000 on the contribution claim, the State would have a right to
be indemnified in that amount by the Survivor. The State would
presumably not be subrogated to the Survivor's claim, however,
because it would already have recouped its payment pursuant to
the settlement when it exercised its right of reimbursement against
the contractor. If the State is held liable on the contribution claim
by the contractor, the State would recoup its payment from the
Survivor pursuant to the indemnification agreement that was part
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of the release form signed by the Survivor. If so, the Survivor would
pay the State $400,000. That means that the Survivor's net
damages would be a total of $1 million, consisting of $400,000 from
the fund and $600,000 net from the tort recovery.
The Contractor would have paid the Survivor $1 million and
the State an additional $400,000, but the Contractor would have
received $400,000 on the contribution claim, limiting its net
exposure to $600,000, which is still more than its fair share (if it is
held liable for any percentage of fault less than 60%).
As a practical matter, however, the State's liability on the
contribution claim will be severely limited. The State's liability on
all contribution claims would be limited by the statutory caps on
damages, including the $400,000 cap on individual liability and the
$1 million per occurrence cap. The State's liability is limited, no
matter how many contribution claims are asserted and no matter
what the amount is of those contribution claims.
3. Subrogation by Other Persons
Subrogation by other parties against either the benefits
provided for in the statute or from the emergency relief fund are
prohibited. Subdivision 4(a) provides:
[N]otwithstanding any statutory or common law or
agreement to the contrary, a person who has paid benefits
or compensation to or on behalf of a survivor does not
have a subrogation or other right to recover those benefits
or compensation by making a claim, or recovering from
payments made, under section 3.7393 or from the
emergency relief fund.298
The statute also provides:
[A] person who believes that the state cannot
constitutionally prohibit assertion of a subrogation claim
and who is claiming a subrogation interest against the
amount to be paid by the state has 40 days after the
settlement agreement was entered into to provide notice
to the state and the survivor of the person's intent to
299assert that interest ....
The person asserting the interest waives the subrogation claim if
notice is not provided by the deadline.0 0 If the commissioner does
298. Id. at subdiv. 4(a).
299. Id. at subdiv. 4(b).
300. Id.
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receive notice of the claim, the bill provides that "the
commissioner shall withhold the payment until the subrogee
abandons or waives the subrogation claim. ' 0 '
The statutory limitation could be challenged by the assertion
of a subrogation claim, which would place the constitutionality of
the bar on subrogation at issue when asserted by the State. The
claim that subrogation cannot be constitutionally barred would
presumably be based on a violation of the remedies clause in the
Minnesota Constitution, providing that every person is entitled to a
64 ,,302"certain remedy ... for all injuries or wrongs ....
4. Collateral Sources
The statute requires settlement offers to be calculated based
on total damages minus three categories of payments to the
survivor:
(1) payments made to the survivor up to the date the
settlement offer is made from the collateral sources
referred to in section 548.36, subdivision 1;
(2) any payment made to the survivor from the
emergency relief fund; and
(3) any payments made or required to be made to the
survivor by a third-party tortfeasor under the terms of a
settlement or other agreement with the survivor that exists
at the time the offer is made or a final judgment in favor
of the survivor concerning claims of the survivor that-- 303
relate to, involve, or arise out of the catastrophe.
The collateral source statute, which provides the guidelines for one
of the reductions required by the compensation scheme, reads in
relevant part as follows:
[F] or purposes of this section, "collateral sources" means
payments related to the injury or disability in question
made to the plaintiff, or on the plaintiff's behalf up to the
date of the verdict, by or pursuant to:
(1) a federal, state, or local income disability or Workers'
Compensation Act; or other public program providing
medical expenses, disability payments, or similar benefits;
301. Id.
302. MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 8. See, e.g., Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs., 716
N.W.2d 634, 640 (Minn. 2006); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 496-97
(Minn. 1997).
303. MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 10.
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(2) health, accident and sickness, or automobile accident
insurance or liability insurance that provides health
benefits or income disability coverage; except life
insurance benefits available to the plaintiff, whether
purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others, payments
made pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, or
pension payments;
(3) a contract or agreement of a group, organization,
partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or
reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental or other
health care services; or
(4) a contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan
provided by employers or any other system intended to
provide wages during a period of disability, except
benefits received from a private disability insurance policy
where the premiums were wholly paid for by the
plaintiff. 3
4
304. Id. § 548.36. Subdivisions 2 and 3 provide the method for the deduction
of collateral sources:
[Iun a civil action, whether based on contract or tort, when liability is
admitted or is determined by the trier of fact, and when damages include
an award to compensate the plaintiff for losses available to the date of the
verdict by collateral sources, a party may file a motion within ten days of
the date of entry of the verdict requesting determination of collateral
sources. If the motion is filed, the parties shall submit written evidence
of, and the court shall determine:
(1) amounts of collateral sources that have been paid for the benefit of
the plaintiff or are otherwise available to the plaintiff as a result of losses
except those for which a subrogation right has been asserted; and
(2) amounts that have been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on
behalf of, the plaintiff or members of the plaintiffs immediate family for
the two-year period immediately before the accrual of the action to
secure the right to a collateral source benefit that the plaintiff is receiving
as a result of losses.
Id. at subdiv. 2. Subdivision 3 states the court's duties under the collateral source
statute:
(a) [T]he court shall reduce the award by the amounts determined
under subdivision 2, clause (1), and offset any reduction in the award by
the amounts determined under subdivision 2, clause (2).
(b) If the court cannot determine the amounts specified in paragraph
(a) from the written evidence submitted, the court may within ten days
request additional written evidence or schedule a conference with the
parties to obtain further evidence.
(c) In any case where the claimant is found to be at fault under section
604.01, the reduction required under paragraph (a) must be made
before the claimant's damages are reduced under section 604.01,
subdivision 1.
Id. at subdiv. 3. The Special Master Panel would follow those calculations in
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The second reduction from total damages is for payments
from the emergency relief fund, which was announced in
November 2007 by Governor Pawlenty and legislative leaders to
provide short-term relief up to $20,000 to cover wage loss due to
the death of or injury to bridge-collapse victims.
The third reduction is for payments a third-party tortfeasor has
to make to the survivor pursuant to the terms of a settlement or
other agreement with the survivor if the settlement or agreement is
in existence at the time the Special Master Panel makes an offer of
settlement to the survivor or if there is a final judgment in favor of
the survivor, provided the payments orjudgment "relate to, involve,
or arise out of the catastrophe. '0 6
An important limitation on deductions is that they must be
from total damages, rather than from the $400,000 that is available
to each survivor under the compensation scheme.0 7
D. Summary of the Minnesota Fund
Minnesota's compensation scheme is limited in scope. It
provides compensation for survivors of the bridge collapse but
limits the compensation in two ways. While the damages for which
compensation is payable include tort and wrongful death damages,
compensation is capped at $400,000, which would be the amount
308of the State's tort liability. Supplemental payments may also be
available for uncompensated economic loss incurred by survivors.
The legislative appropriation of $36.64 million also establishes an
overall limit for the payment of damages, including supplemental
payments.' °9  The interaction between the provisions of the
compensation scheme and the rights and liabilities of both the
State and third parties will be complex as the panel makes its
applying the statute. Section 548.36, subdivision 3(c), covering cases where a
plaintiff is at fault, would be irrelevant, since fault is irrelevant in the
compensation scheme. See MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 7.
305. See MINN. STAT. § 3.7393 subdiv. 10(2).
306. Id. § 3.7394 subdiv. 5(b).
307. Id. § 3.7393 subdiv. 10.
308. Id. at subdiv. 11.
309. The scheme differs in significant respect from the 9/11 scheme. Most of
the claimants from 9/11 made claims under the Fund, where the average award
was $1.8 million, tax free. Feinberg, supra note 66, at 276. Feinberg notes that all
but about seventy potential claimants came into the fund. Sixty filed suits against
the airlines. Id.
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settlement awards and litigation against third parties, who will likely
have their own claims against the State, unfolds.
V. A CONCISE COMPARISON
1. The justification for a legislative response
There is no template for this. Whether any future
compensation scheme will be adopted depends on the political
climate following a catastrophe. That states the obvious, of course,
but there is simply no way, short of a general accident
compensation scheme, that will provide a method of defining
meritorious cases.
The magnitude of the catastrophes and the reasons for the
legislative responses in the 9/11 and 1-35W bridge-collapse cases
differed dramatically in their origin, the number of people injured,
and the motivation for the adoption of a compensation scheme. In
both situations an unanticipated and unprecedented tragedy
absorbed the public's collective conscience. Both tragedies left
various levels of government and private industry scrambling for
answers and the public demanding accountability.
In both tragedies, the tort system provided victims with dismal
prospects of recovery, at least against some of the potential
defendants. This meant that, without the establishment of a
government-backed compensation fund, every victim of these
massive tragedies likely would have obtained little, if any,
compensation. The unique nature of the tragedies, combined with
the limited chances of tort recovery, made the decision to use tax-
payer monies to create a no-fault compensation fund politically
tenable, but nonetheless subject to criticism.
For instance, in Minnesota alone, hundreds of people are
killed each year in motor-vehicle accidents and thousands more
perish in noncompensable accidents, and others are killed or
injured in claims involving the State where the victims face claims
of immunities and statutory caps on recovery. It is difficult to
justify why these victims' lives are less important than those who
died or were injured in the 1-35W bridge collapse, or why the
victims of the 9/11 attacks are more deserving of compensation
than the victims of terrorist attacks in Oklahoma City, the Kenyan
and Tanzanian embassies, the U.S.S. Cole, or even the first WTC
bombings.
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2. Defining the compensable event
In no-fault schemes the compensable event is readily defined.
In workers' compensation it is workplace injury and in no-fault
automobile insurance it is an accident resulting in loss arising out
of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The 9/11 Fund
encountered some difficulty with this problem, initially limiting
compensation to those physically injured or killed within hours of
the attacks. This obviously created several problems because of the
subsequent rescue and cleanup efforts occurring days and months
after the attacks, in which many were injured and killed. In cases
involving catastrophes, the catastrophic occurrence itself is the
defining event and the starting point for creating a compensation
scheme, but defining the compensable event is only part of the
problem.
3. Deciding who is entitled to recover
A third problem is in determining who is entitled to recover
under the compensation scheme. Beyond the immediate victims of
the catastrophe are numerous individuals and entities who may
sustain loss, including family members, people in close
relationships with victims, or even persons who are in business
relationships with the victims. Choosing a model for compensation
presents the potential for creating inherent inequities in the
compensation scheme, depending on how the individuals or
entities deserving of compensation are defined in the enabling
legislation and implementing regulations. The Fund regulations
permitted recovery by victims and their loved ones. Minnesota
limited recovery to survivors, defined as persons who were on the
bridge at the time of the collapse, or if the person perished in the
collapse, the surviving spouse or next of kin as defined in
Minnesota's wrongful death act." ° The limitations in death cases,
and the regulations permitting recovery of loss of consortium, work
to the significant disadvantage of those in relationships not legally
sanctioned. Expanding the list of persons entitled to recover would
place additional strains on any compensation scheme, but as a
matter of fundamental fairness, it is important to recognize that the
suffering and loss of those individuals is no less than those who are
in legally sanctioned relationships.
310. MINN. STAT. § 3.7392 subdiv. 8(3) (2008).
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4. Defining the compensation to be allowed
Establishing the type and amount of compensation is also
critical. Schemes might cover personal injury, loss of consortium,
wrongful death, economic loss, and property damage. Or, damages
might include only economic loss, or also include compensation
for noneconomic loss as well. Minnesota opted to provide
compensation on the basis of a tort model rather than a
government-benefits model, defining the damages survivors were
entitled to recover according to tort law, including wrongful death
damages. The 9/11 Fund took the same basic approach. Both
schemes excluded property damage. Inclusion of property damage
would have created significant definitional problems and would
have significantly increased the cost of the already expensive
compensation schemes.
The approach taken in the Fund was to provide compensation
for economic loss and a set sum for noneconomic loss. The bridge-
collapse scheme provided for undifferentiated compensation for
economic and noneconomic loss. The 9/11 Fund gave the Special
Master substantially greater discretion in formulating guidelines for
awards, including using his discretion to narrow the gap in
economic loss awards. The Minnesota scheme provided that the
Panel should make awards of damages, defined as tort damages.
The maximum amount that can be awarded under the Minnesota
plan is $400,000, with additional potential supplemental awards
solely for economic lOSS. 3 11 The Special Master Panel under the
Minnesota plan is limited in making awards to the specific damages
outlined in the plan.
The two plans also differed drastically in the total amounts that
were appropriated to finance the funds. The only cap on the Fund
was Feinberg's discretion. Accordingly, the Fund's average award
was $1.8 million for all claims, and $2.1 million for death claims.
The Minnesota Fund, however, placed a limited amount of money
into the fund and, as mentioned above, maintains the individual
statutory cap for claims against the State, limiting awards to
$400,000.
311. Id. § 3.7393subdiv. 11.
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5. Determining the impact of collateral sources
An important function of deciding compensation is whether
collateral sources should reduce compensation and, if so, from
what sources. Anyone injured in a catastrophic occurrence will
have other sources of available compensation. One of the
problems in defining the amount of compensation a victim is
entitled to recover will be the treatment of collateral sources.
Deductions could be required from a variety of sources, including
health and life insurance, workers' compensation benefits, social
security benefits, or even funds received by victims through
charitable contributions.
The controversial offsets in the 9/11 Fund for pensions and
life insurance payments were not included in the definition of
collateral sources to be deducted under the Minnesota plan. The
rationale for that reduction was simple. Minnesota's collateral
source statute provided for the reduction of damages in a tort
claim by the specified sources. The plan provided for tort
damages, so it was natural to require the same reductions without
broadening the category of deductible sources. Of course,
Minnesota could have included life insurance and pension
payments, but it would have further reduced damages already
subject to a $400,000 cap.
6. Procedures for processing claims
The procedure to be utilized in determining who actually
receives compensation and in what amount is critical. A variety of
processes might be implemented, ranging from trial forms to
arbitration. The decision of the entity processing claims may be
final, or there may be administrative or judicial appeal from the
decision.
The 9/11 Fund process relied on a Special Master to handle
the administration of compensation under the ATSSSA. Minnesota
relied on a Special Master Panel composed of three experienced
lawyers appointed by the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Submission of claims could be to a single panel member or
to the whole panel. Survivors were also permitted to ask for a
personal appearance before the panel. The process was
streamlined, but, particularly in cases involving claims for
noneconomic loss, the process offered a limited ability to make a
case for that loss.
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7. Limitations on tort claims
The impact on tort claims is an important factor. A no-fault
compensation scheme could result in a complete bar of actions
against the government that created the compensation scheme or
the bar could be broader to include other entities as well.
Legislation providing for compensation would likely include a
waiver of liability against the government if compensation was
accepted. It could condition acceptance on the waiver of other tort
liability as well, or depending on the goals, allow third-party tort
actions without limitation.
Both the Fund and the Minnesota Fund provided incentives
for victims to enter the compensation scheme instead of the tort
system, albeit through slightly different avenues. The Fund was
more focused on creating a compensation scheme that funneled
people into the Fund and away from the tort system. The Fund did
this by restricting the substantive law and jurisdiction for potential
tort claims and by capping the amount by which entities could be
held liable.
The principal purpose of the Fund's underlying statute,
ATSSSA, was to bail out the airline industry and local government
entities. Accordingly, the Fund had to be more attractive than the
tort system to lure claimants away from the potentially astronomical
awards that the tort system might produce. The statutory and
immunity scheme in Minnesota was already so beneficial to the
State that there was no need to create incentives to not enter the
tort system. For example, in the unlikely event that a victim was
able to prove liability and get past the State's ample immunities,
there were still the highly restrictive statutory caps on the amounts
that could be recovered, especially the $1 million per incident cap.
Accordingly, Minnesota did not have to create incentives the way
the framers of the Fund did because the existing statutory and
common-law scheme was already in place.
8. Subrogation and reimbursement rights
A remaining issue is whether subrogation and reimbursement
should be allowed by the entity providing compensation or by
other entities that have provided insurance coverage for victims of
the catastrophe. Subrogation and reimbursement are key factors in
designing a compensation scheme. There is a question as to
whether the government providing the compensation should be
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subrogated to tort claims the victim has against other potential
defendants and if so, in what amount. That decision will turn in
part on the type of compensation the compensation scheme pays,
and in part on whether the legislation scheme permits subrogation
even if the result is that the victim receives less than full
compensation. Legislation may also provide for reimbursement of
the compensation paid under a plan, even if no third-party claim is
asserted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 9/11 and bridge-collapse compensation schemes were
prompted by dramatically different events, but both raised similar
questions. It is by no means obvious that a government-funded
compensation scheme is an appropriate response to these or any
other mass disasters. That issue is the most problematic, of course.
Thousands of others have suffered immeasurable loss because of
similar occurrences, but with no compensation. The difficulty of
determining when there should be compensation militates against
the adoption of a framework for compensation in other similar
mass disaster cases.
No-fault compensation schemes in general are difficult
enough to implement and a general accident compensation
scheme would simply not be feasible. Carving out certain types of
accidents defies definition. Minnesota's scheme characterized the
1-35W bridge collapse as "a catastrophe of historic proportions"
because the bridge was the third-busiest in Minnesota, 13 people
died and more than 100 were injured, and because "[n]o other
structure owned by this state has ever fallen with such devastating
physical and psychological impact on so many."31 2 That defines the
event that justified the compensation scheme, but there are most
certainly other cases that would justify recovery, cases where there
is fault on the part of a governmental entity and where the injuries
are significant enough that the tort system will not provide a
realistic means of compensating multiple victims.
Governing entities, both national and local, will undoubtedly
face unforeseen and catastrophic tragedies in the future. Any
entity seeking to adopt a compensation scheme for a catastrophic
occurrence will have to consider the primary points that governed
the structure of the 9/11 and bridge-collapse compensation
312. Id. § 3.7391 subdiv. 1.
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schemes. Whether to compensate, who to compensate, what the
compensation should cover, and the procedure to achieve those
goals are the major issues. Each involves significant policy
judgments that will shape the structure. The legacy of the 9/11
Fund and the pending legacy of the Minnesota Fund have likely
altered the response to future unforeseen catastrophes. At the very
least, many more governing entities will discuss the merits of
creating a similar scheme. A joint analysis of the 9/11 and
Minnesota Funds provides a starting point for debate and
discussion that any future legislators must address should they
choose to create a compensation scheme.
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